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I. Introduction
On the evening of September 4, 1991, the Intensive Care
Unit was well-lit, the floors were mopped clean under and
around the curtained-off beds, and the scent of disinfectant per-
vaded. A good looking man in his mid-twenties was propped up
against several pillows on one of the beds. His apparently
healthy body, wired though it was with monitors, looked out of
place in a hospital bed. A nurse approached, clad in her dress
whites and armed with a needle. She smiled a greeting, which he
returned.
"What have you got? Another needle for me?"
"Sorry. But, you know what they say - It'll only hurt for a
minute."
Deftly, she lifted the patient's arm, felt for a vein, swabbed
the general area with alcohol-soaked cotton, and prepared the
needle; She did it all very quickly, very practiced. Watching her
curiously, he was surprised to note that her quick hands were
bare. After all, he thought, gallons of blood must spill on the
floors of the Intensive Care Unit each week. What about AIDS?1
"No gloves? Aren't you worried about AIDS? I would have
thought you'd be wearing a suit of armor." He laughed, confi-
dent that he really posed no threat to her.
She laughed back, and proceeded to insert the needle into
his arm. "Oh, we wear them sometimes. I'm not worried with
1. Although the term "AIDS", or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome [hereinaf-
ter "AIDS"], has become almost a household word in the past decade, the more accurate
name for the virus is the Human Immunodeficiency Virus [hereinafter "HIV"]. C. Ever-
ett Koop, Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, at 9,
U.S. Public Health Service (1987)[hereinafter Koop]; see also LAURENCE MASS, MEDICAL
ANSWERS ABOUT AIDS 2-3 (1989)[hereinafter MAss]. HIV is the medical name given to a
virus which attacks the white blood cells in the human blood and gradually breaks down
the body's immune system. Id. at 3. AIDS is but one of the stages of the breakdown of
the immune system in a person infected with HIV. JOHN G. BARTLErr & ANN K.
FINKBENER, THE GuID TO LIVING wrrH HIV INFECTION 1-2 (1991)[hereinafter BARTLETT
& FINKBEINER]. For a more complete discussion and definition of the progression of HIV
and AIDS, see infra notes 12-43 and accompanying text.
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you though. You know how it is. You can usually tell."'2
The nurse's point is clear. Evidently, she believes that the
AIDS virus is common only among drug-users and homosexuals
and that, as a result, sanitary precautions like gloves are neces-
sary only when dealing with these "high risk" people.3 Further,
she is apparently under the impression that drug-users and
homosexuals can easily be identified as they lie in hospital beds
awaiting treatment. She is wrong on both counts.
The point that this true story makes with chilling clarity is
that the nurse's misconceptions about the AIDS virus, prevalent
in the public at large, also exist among health care workers
[hereinafter "HCWs"]. As a result, recommended infection con-
trol procedures are disregarded in many situations;4 gloves and
other infection barriers remain, impotent, in the storage closet.
The risk of transmission from patient to HCW5 and from
HCW to patients is real, even in today's AIDS-conscious society.
This unfortunate fact presents at least two very important, and
2. The above conversation actually took place on the date noted in a hospital in
Newburgh, New York. The patient, who is the author's brother, was under treatment in
the Intensive Care Unit for heart palpitations.
3. "High risk" people are understood to be: (1) males or females who have had un-
protected sexual contact since the mid-to-late 1970s with multiple male or female part-
ners, see infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text; (2) males or females who have used or
shared drug paraphernalia since the mid-to-late 1970s, see infra note 38 and accompany-
ing text; (3) recipients of blood transfusions or blood products from donors who may be
at risk, see infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; (4) recipients of donor sperm or
other donor tissues or organs from persons infected with HIV; (5) unborn children or
breastfed children of women infected with HIV, see infra notes 39-40 and accompanying
text. MAss, supra note 1, at 3-4, 7. The use of shared needles or blades for ritual scar-
ring, acupuncture, tattooing, or piercing the skin will also put recipients at risk. Id.
4. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
5. In the nine years after 1981, when the AIDS epidemic began, there were 19 docu-
mented cases of transmission from patient to health care worker. Dennis L. Breo, The
'Slippery Slope: Handling HIV-infected Health Workers, 264 JAMA 1464, 1464 (1990).
6. According to recent Center for Disease Control [hereinafter CDC] reports, several
patients have been exposed to the fatal virus by their dentist, Dr. David Acer, a Florida
man who recently died of AIDS. See CDC, Possible Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus to a Patient during an Invasive Dental Procedure, 39 MORaDrrY &
MoRTALrry WKLY. REP. 489 (July 27, 1990); CDC, Update: Transmission of HIV Infec-
tion During an Invasive Dental Procedure - Florida, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALrrY WKLY.
REP. 21 (Jan. 18, 1991). The painful story of one of the patients, Kimberly Bergalis, who
was the first of Acer's patients to have been diagnosed as HIV positive, has received
much attention from the press and has added to the public outcry for legislative action
in this arena. For a discussion of the Acer-Bergalis case, see infra notes 70-84 and ac-
companying text.
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somewhat similar, questions. First, what can be done to mini-
mize the risk of transmission of the virus from an infected pa-
tient to an unwary HCW? Second, what can be done to mini-
mize the risk of transmission of the virus from an infected HCW
to an unwary patient? The latter question is the subject of this
Comment.'
Part II of this Comment will examine HIV, its relatively re-
cent discovery, its modes of transmission, and its rapid rise to
notoriety. This section will also discuss the impact that the com-
municable virus has begun to have in the health care setting,
with a focus on the controversial practices of seropositive8
HCWs who perform invasive procedures." The tort concept of
"informed consent" will be introduced, with a discussion of the
types of risks for which the informed consent of a patient has
traditionally been required by tort law.
Part II will also introduce the current guidelines advanced
by the United States Public Health Service, Centers for Disease
Control [hereinafter "CDC"] and will outline some of the most
frequently cited criticisms of these guidelines. Finally, it will ex-
amine the most recent Congressional efforts to monitor the
spread of HIV from HCW to patient and will briefly summarize
the intent of this legislation, emphasizing the great polarization
of views on this issue.
Part III of this Comment will attempt to synthesize the
above considerations, to arrive at a legal and logical solution to
the unsettled controversy of how best to minimize the risk of
transmission from HIV-infected HCWs to their patients. Part
7. Although the former question is beyond the scope of this article, the author does
not suggest that it is of less importance than the latter question. Many of the issues
raised in this article will apply equally to both questions.
8. The word "seropositive" is used to describe a person who has tested positively for
HIV. For descriptions of the tests most commonly used, see infra, notes 44-47 and ac-
companying text.
9. An invasive procedure is defined as a surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or or-
gans or repair of major traumatic injuries associated with any of the following- 1) An
operating or delivery room, emergency department, or outpatient setting, including both
physicians' and dentists' offices; 2) cardiac catheterization and angiographic procedures;
3) a vaginal or caesarean delivery or other invasive obstetric procedure during which
bleeding may occur; or 4) the manipulation, cutting, or removal of any oral or perioral
tissues, including tooth structure, during which bleeding occurs. CDC, Recommendations
for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B Virus to




IV will conclude that HCWs who perform invasive procedures
should be required by state law to undergo periodic testing for
the virus and that those HCWs who test positively should be
required to obtain their patients' informed consent before per-
forming further invasive procedures. Although this solution may
well be disagreeable and appear to be an overreaction to the rel-
atively small minority of people it will adversely impact,10 this
Comment will conclude that, where public health is concerned,
the state and federal governments have little choice but to err
on the side of caution.
II. Background
A. The History of the Disease
"There are no such things as incurables; there are only
things for which man has not found a cure."
- Bernard M. Baruch 1
In 1981, five young homosexual men had the dubious honor
of becoming the first reported cases of AIDS in the United
States. 2 Ten years later, reduction of the incidence of AIDS
ranks among the nation's top health priorities."3 The virus which
causes AIDS is most commonly known as HIV.1 4 This virus at-
10. A mandatory testing and disclosure scheme will impact adversely on the prac-
tices of those HCWs who test positively for HIV, for many patients may choose to forego
treatment or to go to another HCW rather than accept the risk of transmission.
11. Bernard M. Baruch in INSTANT QUOTATION DicTIoNARY 87 (Donald 0. Bolander
et al. eds. 1972).
12. W. Meade Morgan & James W. Curran, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome:
Current and Future Trends, 101 PUB. HEALTH REP. 459, 459 (Sept./Oct. 1986) (citing
Pneumocystis Pneumonia - Los Angeles, 30 MoRBmrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 250
(June 5, 1981)). While the five Los Angeles AIDS patients were the first AIDS cases
officially reported in the U.S., scientists are not certain that these were actually the
earliest cases in the U.S. See W. Robert Lange, Followup Study of Possible HIV Sero-
positivity Among Abusers of Parenteral Drugs in 1971 - 72, 106 PUB. HEALTH REP. 451,
451 (July/Aug. 1991). Scientists have not ruled out the possibility that there were unde-
tected cases in the U.S. prior to 1981. Id.
13. Lawrence 0. Gostin, et al., The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in Con-
trolling AIDS - Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 Am. J.L. & MED. 7, 7 n.1 (1986)
(citing 15 FDA DRUG BULL. 26 (1985)) [hereinafter Gostin].
14. Scientists have also called the virus HTLV-IU (Human T-Lymphotropic Virus
Type M) and LAV (Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus). The three labels, HIV,
HTLV-M, and LAV, all refer to the same virus. Koop, supra note 1, at 9; Gostin, supra
[Vol. 12:665
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tacks the body's immune system by penetrating and breaking
down certain white blood cells, the T-Lymphocytes. 15
As a result of the breakdown, the body is unable to effec-
tively fight other disease.1 6 The person is increasingly suscepti-
ble to infection by various protozoa, bacteria, fungi, and viruses
which are ordinarily blocked by the immune system. 17 The indi-
vidual is thus faced with life-threatening illnesses, such as can-
cer, pneumonia, and meningitis.18 These illnesses are often re-
ferred to as "opportunistic diseases"19 because they use "the
opportunity of lowered resistance to infect and destroy. '20 Op-
portunistic diseases are often a clear earmark of advanced sero-
positivity, because they are illnesses to which a healthy immune
system would be resistant. 1
note 13, n.5-6, at 8-9.
15. "Lymphocytes are the main functional cells of the lymphatic or immune sys-
tem." MCH L H. Ross & LYNN J. ROMRELL, HIsTOLOGY: A TEXT AND ATLAs 190 (2d ed.
1989) (emphasis omitted)[hereinafter Ross & ROMaELL]. The majority of the lympho-
cytes in blood or lymph have developed the capacity to recognize and respond to foreign
antigen. Id. An antigen is defined as "any substance that the body regards as foreign or
potentially dangerous and against which [the body] produces an antibody." THE BANTAM
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 25 (Revised ed. 1990). An antibody is "a special kind of blood pro-
tein that is synthesized in lymphoid tissue in response to the presence of a particular
antigen .... [The antibody] circulates in the plasma to attack the antigen and render it
harmless." Id. at 24. "All lymphocytes are involved in the phenomenon of immunological
memory and are primed during their maturation to respond to a specific antigen." Ross
& ROMR LL, supra at 190 (emphasis omitted). The lymphocytes present in the body are
split into two categories - "T-lymphocytes", or "T-cells", and "B-lymphocytes", or "B-
cells." Id. The T-cells are likewise broken down into three fundamentally different types:
(1) cytotoxic lymphocytes, (2) helper lymphocytes, and (3) suppressor lymphocytes. ID.
These are necessary for, among other things: (1) recognition and destruction of other
cells that have foreign antigens on their surfaces; (2) assistance and stimulation of B-
cells and other T-cells in their response to antigens; and (3) suppression of the body's
immune response to "self molecules," which are normally present in the body. Id. at 190-
92. Each variation of the T-cell plays a specific, key role in the immune system. Id.
16. BARTLETr & FINKBEINER, supra note 1, at 62. "The diseases which invade a sero-
positive individual are caused by microbes to which everyone is exposed on a regular
basis but which lack clout; usually a modest effort by the immune system is enough to
defeat them. A suppressed immune system, however, is unable to fight off these infec-
tions." Id.
17. Id.
18. MASS, supra note 1, at 19-24.
19. Koop, supra note 1, at 10.
20. Id. (emphasis in original).
21. Opportunistic diseases are sometimes also called AIDS defining conditions, be-
cause "someone with one for more] of these conditions, by definition, has AIDS." BART-
LETT & FINKBEINER, supra note 1, at 62.
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After the virus enters the blood stream, the body recognizes
the presence of an antigen22 and, in response, produces antibo-
dies.23 The antibodies, when detected by a blood test, point to
the presence of HIV in the bloodstream.2' Ironically, although
the existence of antibodies marks the presence of the virus in
the system, scientists have found that these antibodies do noth-
ing to check the spread of the disease".2  Thus, the immune sys-
tem recruits and sends into battle an army of unarmed and inca-
pacitated antibodies.2 1 This impotent legion of antibodies is in
place and identifiable anywhere from about three to twelve
weeks after initial exposure to HIV.27 During the early stages,
for a period following exposure, most infected people are with-
out apparent symptoms, 28 although they are able to pass the dis-
The two most common opportunistic diseases are pneumocystis carinii pneumonia
(a fungal infection of the lung) and Kaposi's sarcoma (cancerous lesions of the skin, mu-
cous membranes, internal organs and blood vessels). Id. at 62-64; MASS, supra note 1, at
19-20. Other, albeit less common, opportunistic infections include, but are not limited to:
mycobacterium tuberculosis (pneumonia and systemic infection caused by bacteria); in-
fections of the central nervous system, such as toxoplasmic encephalitis (a parasitic in-
fection of the brain); non-Hodgkin's lymphomas (a cancer of the lymph tissues); herpes
simplex infection (viral infections primarily of the mouth and the genitals). See BART-
LET & FINKBEINER, supra note 1, at 63-69; Harry Hollander & Mitchell H. Katz, AIDS
and Related Conditions, in CURmEr MEDIcAL DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT 939, 94248
(Steven A. Schroeder et al., eds. 30th ed. 1991) [hereinafter Hollander & Katz]; MAss,
supra note 1 at 19-20 (1989). These infections are usually encountered in the later stages
of HIV infection, when the patient is experiencing full-blown, or classic AIDS. BARTLETr
& FINKBEINER, supra note 1, at 63-69; Hollander & Katz, supra at 942-48.
22. For a definition of "antigen" see supra note 15.
23. For a definition of "antibody" see supra note 15.
24. For a description of the tests used to identify these antibodies, see infra notes
44-47 and accompanying text.
25. MAss, supra note 1, at 16. "With most antibody tests, a positive re-
sult - antibodies have been detected - implies some immunity to the disease. This is
apparently not the case with HIV antibody tests. This unusual circumstance has not yet
been explained." Id.
26. Koop, supra note 1, at 27.
27. Michael J. Barry, et al., Screening for HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits, and the
Burden of Proof, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 261-62 (1986).
28. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 15 (citing Mackiin & Friedland, AIDS Research:
The Ethics of Clinical Trials, 14 LAW, MED. & HEMLTH CARE 273-80 (1986)). The latency
period between infection and manifestation of symptoms may be quite long - five or
even ten years. Gostin, supra note 13, at 15 (citing Macklin & Friedland, AIDS Re-
search: The Ethics of Clinical Trials, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 273, 278 (1986)); see
also Tedd V. Ellerbrock et al., Epidemiology of Women With AIDS in the United
States, 1981 Through 1990: A Comparison With Heterosexual Men With AIDS, 265
JAMA 2971, 2974 (1991) [hereinafter Ellerbrock].
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/5
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ease on to others.29
The severity and speed of progression of the disease vary
from individual to individual °30 The HIV positive person may re-
main asymptomatic for quite some time, 1 may progress into the
more advanced stages of AIDS-related complex [hereinafter
"ARC"], 32 or may develop full-blown AIDS.3 3 Generally, once a
"Physicians have been tantalized by the puzzle of people with longstanding HIV
infections who haven't developed symptoms." Jean Seligman & Mary Hager, In Flo-
rence, a Meeting of Mysteries, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 56. According to Dr. Jay
Levy, of the University of California, San Francisco, some individuals' immune systems
naturally produce a substance which seems to temporarily halt the replication of the
virus in the body. Id. This can result in a latency period which may last as long as a
decade. Id.
29. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 8 n.3. "It is estimated that for every person who
meets the CDC definition of AIDS, there are between 50 and 100 who have the [HIV]
infection and are capable of transmitting it." Gostin, supra note 13, at 8 n.3. For the
CDC definition of AIDS, see infra note 33.
30. Researchers are not certain that all HIV positive persons will eventually develop
AIDS. See Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 948. However, studies of seropositive
individuals, whose date of exposure is known, have shown that roughly 50 percent of
untreated HIV positive people will progress into AIDS within ten years. Id. "When the
[acquired immune deficiency] syndrome was [initially] found to be caused by [HIV], it
became obvious that severe opportunistic infections... were at one end of a spectrum of
disease, while healthy seropositive individuals were at the other end." Id.
31. Koop, supra note 1, at 11.
32. Koop, supra note 1, at 10-11. ARC, a condition caused by HIV, is manifest in a
specific set of clinical symptoms, but is somewhat less severe than full-blown AIDS.
MAss, supra note 1, at 9-10. ARC symptoms often include: loss of appetite, weight loss,
fever, night sweats, skin rashes, diarrhea, fatigue, susceptibility to infection, and swollen
lymph nodes. Koop, supra note 1, at 11. According to some researchers, the label "ARC"
should be avoided, because it represents a broad group of patients whose symptoms are
heterogeneous and whose clinical problems and prognoses are very different. Hollander
& Katz, supra note 21, at 939. As a result, the label is not very descriptive or specific,
and the term ARC is not officially recognized by the CDC in its surveillance and report-
ing system. MAss, supra note 1, at 9-10.
33. Although the name, AIDS, is used almost generically to describe the symptoms
of the deadly HIV, AIDS actually refers to the very advanced stages of HIV progression.
See BARTLrr & FINKBEINER, supra note 1, at 1-2. Broken into its parts, the name "ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome" is more meaningful: Acquired indicates that the
virus is not inherited (as many diseases of immune deficiency are), but is acquired from
outside the body. Id. Immune Deficiency refers to the weakened state of the body's es-
sential immune system. Id. Syndrome indicates that the virus brings on a series of symp-
toms and complications, rather than just a single disease or condition. Id.
The CDC's 1987 classification is more technical. It "defines a variety of definitively
or presumptively diagnosed opportunistic infections ... as evidence of AIDS. The CDC
criteria also specify AIDS diagnoses based upon documented weight loss, diarrhea, or
dementia in a patient with positive HIV serology." Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at
939.
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person's illness has advanced to the classic AIDS stage, death is
imminent,"' because no cure has, as yet, been discovered.3
The lapse of time is especially problematic, in light of the
virus' modes of transmission. Transmission most often occurs
during sexual activity,3 6 especially anal intercourse.3 7 Intrave-
Under the CDC definition, an AIDS case is "an instance of a disease, at least moder-
ately predictive of a defect in cell-mediated immunity, occurring with HIV infection or
no known cause for diminished resistance to that disease." Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at
2971.
"Increased use of the HIV antibody test and greater understanding of the spectrum
of HIV-related diseases led to a revision of the case definition in 1987 that expanded the
list of diseases indicative of AIDS and included some diseases diagnosed presumptively
(i.e., without histological or laboratory confirmation)." Id.
34. One study focused on the incidence of AIDS in women and heterosexual men,
and concluded that the two groups' average life-spans after the initial diagnosis of AIDS
were not statistically different. Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2974. After studying the
speed of progression of the disease in a group of 10,558 women and 26,362 heterosexual
men (as reported to the CDC as of December 31, 1989), the researchers found that the
median survival time from diagnosis to death for women was 9.8 months, and was 9.3
months for heterosexual men. Id.
35. MASs, supra note 1, at 24.
36. HIV is present in virtually all of the body fluids of an infected person, including
his or her blood, semen, or vaginal secretions. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 948.
Transmission during sexual activity can occur when HIV in these bodily fluids enters the
bloodstream through tiny, unseen tears in the lining of the vagina, rectum, or mouth.
Koop, supra note 1, at 16. Female to male and, more commonly, male to female trans-
mission does occur, but the "exact mechanisms" of this heterosexual transmission are
the subject of continued study. MASS, supra note 1, at 6. Recent evidence that HIV may
directly infect the inner lining cells of the vagina and cervix may explain male to female
transmission during vaginal intercourse where there was no bleeding. Id. Similarly, fe-
male to male transmission may occur where the male urethral mucosa is exposed to in-
fected female body fluids. MAss, supra note 1, at 6. The virus has also been detected in
tears and saliva, but only in such small quantities that the risk of transmission from
tears or saliva is considered exceedingly small; and to date there have been no recorded
cases of infection through this route of transmission. Koop, supra rote 1, at 25.
37. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 948. Anal intercourse is considered to be
the sexual act with the highest risk. Id. Unprotected anal intercourse is believed to be
very risky because rectal tissue is easily torn, and as a result HIV infected sperm have
direct access to the receptive partner's bloodstream. MAss, supra note 1, at 7. In addi-
tion, recent evidence suggests that HIV may directly infect the cells of the inner lining of
the colon (including the anus and rectum). Id. Anal intercourse is likewise dangerous for
the insertive partner, for transmission is believed possible where the male urethral mu-
cosa is exposed to the contaminated blood or body fluids of an infected partner. Id. at 6.
Increased numbers of sexual partners, receptive anal intercourse, and other sexual prac-
tices causing "rectal trauma" have been identified as high risk behaviors. See Warren
Winkelstein, Jr. et al., Sexual Practices and Risk of Infection by the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus: The San Francisco Men's Health Study 257 JAMA 321, 324-25
(1987).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/5
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nous [hereinafter "IV"] drug use is the second most common ve-
hicle for transmission.38 Furthermore, women who have been in-
fected by the virus can pass it, in utero, to their unborn
children 9 or to their infants, through breast milk. 0 In the early
1980s, blood transfusions also provided a route of transmission;41
but improved screening techniques have virtually eliminated
this type of HIV transmission.42 Research has shown that the
virus is not transmitted through respiratory vapors in the air, by
insects, or by casual, non-sexual contact.43
Several tests have been developed to identify the presence
of HIV antibodies in the blood. In the United States, the two
most commonly used are the "ELISA" and the "Western Blot"
tests.45 Although there were initial concerns about the consis-
38. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 939. Intravenous drug users comprise about
16 percent of the diagnosed cases of AIDS in the U.S. Id. Transmission through IV drug
use occurs most often when a drug user "shoots up," injecting drugs directly into his or
her bloodstream. Id.; Koop, supra note 1, at 19. A user may be infected when a previ-
ously used needle contains remnants of the HIV-contaminated blood of another user.
Hollander & Katz, supra 21, at 939; Koop, supra note 1, at 19. This problem is wide-
spread in the drug using populations, especially in the nation's inner cities, because
many users share needles and drug paraphernalia. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at
939; Koop, supra note 1, at 19.
39. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 939. Roughly 30 to 50 percent of children
born to seropositive mothers will contract HIV infection. Id.
40. See Gostin, supra note 13, at 22.
41. Id. at 15. It is estimated that two percent of reported AIDS cases resulted from
infection by contaminated blood or blood products. Id. People who received transfusions
prior to January 1985 may have encountered HIV contaminated supplies, because up
until that time, blood screening techniques were inadequate to cull the bad blood from
the good. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 939.
42. Today, screening techniques are much more reliable and are considered to prom-
ise a very safe blood supply, with the risk of contracting HIV from a screened unit of
blood estimated at one in one hundred thousand. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at
939; Koop, supra note 1, at 22.
43. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 939; MAss, supra note 1, at 6-9.
44. MAss, supra note 1, at 14-16. The tests used to detect seropositivity do not actu-
ally isolate the virus; rather, the tests look for the presence (or absence) of antibodies
which an infected body will produce in reaction to HIV. See also, CDC, Update: Sero-
logic Testing for Antibody to Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 36 MORBIDITY & MOR-
TALmrY WKLY. REP. 833, 834 (1988); Schwartz, Dans & Kinosian, Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Test Evaluation, Performance and Use, 259 JAMA 2574, 2574
(1988). See also Elaine M. Sloand et al., HIV Testing; State of the Art, 266 JAMA 2861
(1991) (discussing HIV antibody tests).
45. MAss, supra note 1, at 15-16. The ELISA is the enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assay, also called enzyme immuno assay (EIA). This test indicates the level of HIV an-
tibodies present in an individual's blood sample. Id. If the results of the first ELISA
9
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tency and accuracy of these two tests,4 it is now generally ac-
knowledged that, when used in conjunction with one another,
they are quite reliable.47
The United States Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, through the CDC, has established the CDC AIDS Surveil-
lance System in order to keep up to date on the AIDS crisis in
the U.S. and its territories.' 8 In each of the states, doctors who
diagnose a case of AIDS must report it to their respective state
health department.49 A doctor's report may or may not give the
indicate seropositivity, further testing is generally performed to reduce the possibility of
laboratory error. Id. Where further ELISA tests also demonstrate seropositivity, a West-
ern blot test is usually conducted in order to confirm the ELISA results. Id. For a more
detailed description of these tests, see id.; Barry, supra note 27, at 259-66; Gostin, supra
note 13, at 13.
46. See, e.g., R. Bayer et al., HIV Antibody Screening: An Ethical Framework for
Evaluating Proposed Programs, 256 JAMA 1768, 1769 (1986) [hereinafter Bayer];
Marwick, Use of the Antibody Test May Provide More Answers, 253 JAMA 1694, 1694-
95, 1699 (1985) (discussing concerns that the tests would reflect false negatives or false
positives, which would either foster a false sense of security or would unnecessarily alarm
the individual tested).
47. Gostin, supra note 13, at 13. When used alone, without a supplemental test such
as the Western Blot, the ELISA has proven "reasonably sensitive" (because it registers
positive in a high proportion of patients with HIV) and "reasonably specific" (because it
registers negative in a high proportion of healthy blood donors). Id. at 11. Specifically,
the range of sensitivity of the ELISA has been reported at 93.4 to 99.6%, while the range
of specificity has been reported at 98.6 to 99.6%. Id. at 11 n.14. "The current sequence of
tests used to detect antibodies against HIV, when performed under well controlled con-
ditions in good laboratories, yield both a sensitivity and specificity of greater than 99.8
percent." Government of the Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 900 (1991)
(quoting Report of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Vi-
rus Epidemic 80, at 2 (June 1988)).
Because the ELISA is not always accurate and may show a false negative or a false
positive, the National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference State-
ment on HIV Antibody Testing urges supplemental testing. Gostin, supra note 13, at 13.
Additional testing should effectively eliminate the margin of error. Id. at 11.
However, despite the high reliability of the two tests when used together, they sim-
ply cannot detect the virus before the antibody levels have risen in the body in response
to the antigen, HIV. Bayer, supra note 46, at 1769. The time lapse between exposure to
HIV and detection in the bloodstream will vary with the individual, sometimes taking
several weeks or even months. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. This factor
can sometimes cause a negative test result when the person actually has the disease in
his or her system. Bayer, supra note 46, at 1769.
48. See Allison L. Greenspan, James W. Curran, Communicating Surveillance, Epi-
demiologic, and Laboratory Information on HIV Infection and AIDS, 106 PuB. HEALTH
REPORTS 721, 724 (1991). The CDC AIDS Surveillance System covers the 50 states, the
U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia. Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2971.
49. Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2971. "Laws requiring the reporting of communica-
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patient's name and the probable origin of the disease, depending
on the individual state's policy. Some states statutorily require
that doctors report positive HIV test results, while other states
require only that cases that have advanced to AIDS or ARC be
reported. 1 The state health departments, in turn, report the
numbers (without names and personal information) to the CDC,
where the information is compiled.52 Because there are often
time lapses between exposure and detection of HIV and much
longer lapses between exposure and symptomatic manifestation
and diagnosis of AIDS,5 3 the statistics currently at our disposal
most likely misrepresent the true numbers who are carrying the
ble diseases are among the oldest instruments in the armamentarium of public health.
All states have them." Harold Edgar & Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the
Age of AIDS: Legislative Options, 16 Am. JL. AND MED. 155, 164 (1990)[hereinafter Ed-
gar and Sandomire]. The reports serve various state needs. Id. Most notably, the reports
are useful for: (1) estimating the disease's incidence; (2) gathering information about the
disease itself and its "natural history", which is used to understand the probable origins
and cause of the disease and may also contribute to a prediction of the disease's future
spread; and (3) contacting those who have been exposed, in the hopes of treatment,
should it become available. Id.
50. Id. at 166. The reporting of names and other personal data has not gone without
objection. Id. at 159. As one article noted, "[tihe principal battleground in American
AIDS related legislation is the extent to which the confidentiality concerns of those in-
fected with HIV should receive special legal protection as against the plausible needs of
an array of actors ... to know HIV-related information about them." Id.
51. Id. at 166-67 nn. 33-36 (citing ALA. CODE § 22-11A-14(a) (Supp. 1989); COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 25-4-1402, 1403 (1989) (requiring report of HIV positive test, AIDS or HIV
related illness); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.609(2)(f)(5) (West Supp. 1989) (requiring report of
HIV test result); IDAHO CODE § 39-606 (1989) (requiring report of those being treated for
HIV, ARC, and AIDS, etc.); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.025 (7)(b)(3) (West 1989) (requiring
report of presence of test result HTLV-Ill antibody); MICH. Comls. LAws ANN.
§333.5114(1) (West Supp. 1989) (requiring report of HIV infection); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
CODE ANN. § 18-207 (Supp. 1989) (requiring report of HIV infection); Mo. REv. STAT. §
191.653(3) (Supp. 1990) (requiring report of identity of any individual "confirmed to be
infected with HIV."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/s, para. 7354 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989);
FLA, STAT ANN. § 384.25 (West 1989)(reporting cases of AIDS, ARC, and HIV positive
test results, but reporting of the latter only if federal funding has been provided and
after the health department has passed necessary regulations); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6002
(1988) (requiring report of those who are suffering from or died of AIDS); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1603.1(c) (West Supp. 1990) (reporting of transfusion associated AIDS);
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1603.1(d) (West Supp. 1990) (reporting of transfusion
associated AIDS); Id. § 1603(1)(d) (requiring report of hospitalized confirmed AIDS and
transfusion associated AIDS)); VA CODE ANN. § 32:1-36(c)(1988) (permitting report of
cases); TENN. CODE ANN. §68-5-102(1989) (permitting report of suspected cases of AIDS).
52. Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2971-72.
53. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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AIDS virus.5
While homosexual and bisexual males" and IV drug users
comprise the greatest percentage of people afflicted with HIV,
these populations are by no means the only people at risk. 6 An-
yone who comes into contact with the body fluids or blood of an
infected person is also at risk of infection. As the years pass,
the virus is increasingly spreading58 to women and the hetero-
54. BARTLE'T & FINKBEINER, supra note 13, at 62. It is generally estimated that only
about ten percent of the seropositive population currently has advanced to AIDS; it is
only for that portion of seropositive people that we have true statistics. Id.
Since severe, clinical manifestations of HIV disease are required for the diagnosis
of AIDS and the median time for progression from HIV infection to AIDS may be
as long as 10 years, patients with AIDS represent only part of the HIV epidemic.
Persons infected with HIV who are asymptomatic or have HIV-related symptoms
not included in the AIDS case definition represent the other, much larger part of
the epidemic. In 1989, an estimated 1 million persons were infected with HIV in
the United States.
Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2974. (citations omitted).
The CDC, itself, is cognizant of the failings of its database. CDC, HIV Infection
Reporting - United States, 262 JAMA 889, 890 (1989).
HIV infection reports that are now integral to public health programs in many
states are not anticipated to be representative of all HIV-infected persons. Such
reports represent only those persons within the infected population who are tested
and reported at a given time. Testing and reporting may be influenced by factors
other than the incidence and prevalence of AIDS, e.g., public awareness of risk
factors, confidentiality concerns, and testing accessibility. While HIV infection re-
ports complement other HIV/AIDS studies of HIV infection in a community,
AIDS surveillance and the HIV family of surveys remain the basis for determining
the current status and course of HIV infection in the United States.
Id. at 890. (citations omitted).
55. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 939. In the U.S., homosexual and bisexual
men make up 80 percent of the reported cases of AIDS. Id.
56. Id.
57. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 939; see supra note 35 and accompanying
text.
58. Hollander & Katz, supra note 21, at 939. It is estimated that there are about
1,000,000 people in the United States who are currently infected with HIV. Id. Although
during the AIDS scare in the early eighties huge increases in the number of people with
AIDS were predicted, fortunately the actual increase in the past ten years has been less
than anticipated. Id. This may be attributable to the tremendous efforts toward increas-
ing public awareness and education about the disease. Id. In San Francisco, for instance,
transmission to "high risk" homosexual men has fallen to less than 1 percent annually
since 1983. Id.
Despite these encouraging figures, the disease continues to take a terrible toll on our
population. Id. Recent estimates put the number of living Americans with AIDS in 1991
at somewhere between 127,000 and 153,000. Id. The rate of increase is expected to be
roughly 50,000 per year, with the greatest percent increase in inner city intravenous drug
users, particularly blacks and Latinos. Id. While HIV is not known to infect one racial or
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/5
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sexual population59 and is also beginning to spread outward
from the major metropolitan areas where it was originally
concentrated. 0
Given the increasing numbers who have been infected with
the virus, it is almost inevitable that the disease will rear its ugly
head in every level of society and in every occupation and pro-
fession. The health care field is no exception.e l One study re-
vealed that as of March 31, 1991, the number of diagnosed AIDS
cases among HCWs in the United States was greater than
6,400.62 This number included 703 reported cases of diagnosed
AIDS in physicians (including 47 in surgeons), 1,358 in nurses,
ethnic group over another, factors such as increased prevalence of high risk behaviors
and decreased education and access to health care in certain geographical areas can
cause disproportionate impact on racial or ethnic groups. MASS, supra note 1, at 5.
59. See Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2972. See also Gostin, supra note 13, at 22-23,
nn. 63-64 (citing Fischl, Dickinson & Scott, Evaluation of Heterosexual Partners, Chil-
dren, and Household Contacts of Adults with AIDS, 257 JAMA 640, 643-44 (1987);
Whittington, Krauss, Lee & Nahmias, The Prevalence of HTL V-III/LA V Antibodies in
Heterosexuals, 255 JAMA 1702, 1702-03 (1986); CDC, Heterosexual Transmission of
Human T-lymphotropic Virus Type IJI/Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus, 34 MOR-
aIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REPORT 561, 561-62 (1985)).
As of December 31, 1990, roughly 10 percent (a total of 15,493) of the 158,279 adults
reported with AIDS in the United States were women. See Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at
2972. Between 1985 and 1990, the percentage of adult AIDS cases in women increased
from 6.6% to 11.5%. Id. Likewise, the percentage of cases in heterosexual men also in-
creased during that period. Id. See also Gostin, supra note 13, at 22-23, nn. 63-64 (citing
Fischl, Dickinson & Scott, Evaluation of Heterosexual Partners, Children, and House-
hold Contacts of Adults with AIDS, 257 JAMA 640 (1987); Whittington, Krauss, Lee &
Nahmias, The Prevalence of HTL V-III/LA V Antibodies in Heterosexuals, 255 JAMA
1702 (1986); CDC, Heterosexual Transmission of Human T-lymphotropic Virus Type
Ill/Lymphadenopathy Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDrrY & MoRTALrrY WKLY. REPORT 561
(1985)).
60. Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2973. The virus has been found to be concentrated
in certain geographical areas. Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2973. As of December 31,
1990,. 70 percent (or 26,657) of the 38,103 cases of AIDS in heterosexual men were re-
ported from the same ten reporting areas. Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2973. The high-
est cumulative incidence rates of AIDS cases in heterosexual men were as follows: Puerto
Rico had the highest (224 per 100,000 adult male population), followed by New York
(179 per 100,000), New Jersey (158 per 100,000), Washington, D.C. (154 per 100,000),
and Florida (75 per 100,000). Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2973. New York had the larg-
est number of both women (4,830) and heterosexual men (12,427) with AIDS. New
Jersey had the second largest number of AIDS cases for these two groups (2,120 women
and 4,782 heterosexual men). New Jersey was followed by Florida (1,923 women and
3,802 heterosexual men). Ellerbrock, supra note 28, at 2973.
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1,101 in health aids, 171 in dentists and dental hygienists, 319 in
therapists, 116 in paramedics, and 941 in technicians. 3 These
figures represent only those cases among HCWS where the HIV
infection had advanced to (and been clinically diagnosed as)
AIDS as of the date of the study."" It is also important to note
that "[p]resumably, many times that number are infected with
HIV, but have not yet developed clinical AIDS." 6
B. HIV in the Health Care Setting - The Growing Debate:
"There are other Dr. Acers out there . . .his pocketbook
meant more to him than his conscience."66
The presence of HIV infected HCWs in our nation's health
care facilities has begun to cause quite a stir in the public, the
government, and the health care community, as each begins to
consider the risks of transmission in the health care setting.81
The question of the legal and ethical right of an infected HCW
to continue practicing the "craft" without informing his68 pa-
tients of his infection is at the core of this heated controversy.
The focus has largely been on the HCW whose duties entail ex-
tensive invasive procedures.6 9
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Mark Barnes, The HIV Infected Health Care Professional: Employment Poli-
cies and Public Health 18:4 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 311, 320 (Winter, 1990) (cita-
tions omitted). See also Kantrowitz, supra note 56, at 50. According to one article, an
estimated 50,000 HOWs are currently infected with HIV. Jane Gross, Many Doctors In-
fected With AIDS Don't Follow New U.S. Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1991, at 20.
This number was calculated using a "commonly used multiplier." Id.
66. Words of Barbara Webb, patient of the late Dr. David J. Acer. Dr. Acer died of
AIDS, but not before he transmitted HIV to five of his dental patients. Catherine Wood-
ard, State Affirms HIV Policy for Health-Care Workers, NEWSDAY (Nassau, Suffolk),
Oct. 9, 1991, at 17. For discussion of the Acer cases, see infra notes 70-84 and accompa-
nying text.
67. Laurie Garrett, Dentist's Lethal Legacy, NEWSDAY (Nassau, Suffolk), August 18,
1991, at 4. "The Kimberly Bergalis impact has caused huge volumes of letters to mem-
bers of Congress - enormous, unprecedented quantities," said Carol Wolchok, a Wash-
ington lobbyist for the American Bar Association. "And most of it is just saying, 'Do
something. Do something about AIDS.'" Id.
68. The author's use of the word "his" (rather than "hers") is not intended to be
limiting or sexist, but is in the interest of clarity.
69. See, e.g., Only One Florida Dentist, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 17, 1992, at
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss3/5
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The risk of transmission from HCW to patient during inva-
sive procedures was driven home with the very recent and much
publicized case of Kimberly Bergalis, a young Florida woman
who contracted AIDS from her dentist, David Acer.70 Hers was
the first documented case of HCW-to-patient transmission of
HIV.7 1 Soon after the news of Bergalis' diagnosis, it was an-
nounced that Dr. Acer had also infected four other patients. 2
The Acer cases represent the realization of a latent fear; trans-
mission of HIV in the health care setting has become not just a
theoretical possibility, but a harsh reality.
This case presented a special dilemma for the health care
community because both Dr. Acer and Ms. Bergalis recalled that
Dr. Acer had worn gloves and a mask during the dental proce-
dures. 3 It seemed to call into question the efficacy of the recom-
mended infection barriers and thus brought an unwelcome note
of mystery into the arena.7' The health care community's re-
sponse to this enigma has been varied."
Those who oppose restrictions on the practices of HIV posi-
tive HCWs have made much of the fact that, to date, Dr. Acer's
70. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Bergalis' story has initiated what has
been called "the explosive national controversy over AIDS-infected health-care workers."
Kantrowitz, supra note 61, at 49. Shortly after Bergalis was diagnosed with AIDS, she
was questioned about the possible origins of her infection. Her case was puzzling to the
authorities, because she did not fit in any of the known "risk groups" - she was a vir-
gin, and she had never used IV drugs. Bergalis recalled that she had visited her dentist,
David Acer, two years before to have her wisdom teeth extracted. Acer had been diag-
nosed with full-blown AIDS just three months before the dental procedure. Breo, supra
note 6 at 1466.
Investigators were unable to obtain much information about Bergalis from Acer.
State confidentiality laws prevented them from inquiring specifically about the patient,
and Acer spoke only once to investigators before securing a lawyer and cutting off talks.
The investigators were, however, able to glean some information from the dentist as to
his general office practices. Id.
71. Blsa Brenner, Volunteers of America Assisting in AIDS Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
29, 1991, at 10.
72. Kantrowitz, supra note 61, at 50. These other patients are Barbara Webb, 66, of
Palm City, Fla.; Richard Driskill, 32, of Indiantown, Fla.; Lisa Shoemaker, 35, who now
lives in Michigan; and John Yecs, 35, of Stuart, Fla. See Laurie Garrett, Dentist's Lethal
Legacy, NEWSDAY (Nassau, Suffolk), Aug. 18, 1991, at 4.
73. Barbara Gerbert et al., Possible Health Care Professional-to-Patient HIV
Transmission; Dentists' Reactions to a Centers for Disease Control Report, 265 JAMA
1845, 1845 (1991).
74. Id. at 1845-46.




patients are the only documented cases of doctor to patient
transmission of HIV.78 Apparently, some are skeptical of the
CDC's report," believing that the investigation into the Bergalis
case was inadequate to support a conclusion that transmission
occurred from HCW to patient.71 One article, written for the
Journal of the American Medical Association, reported the re-
sults of a survey in which dentists were questioned about their
reactions to the CDC report on the Acer case.79 Many of the
dentists surveyed reported that they were not convinced that
the CDC had investigated sufficiently.80 In response to the den-
tists' skepticism, the article's authors commented, "This denial
in itself is curious. The CDC had investigated the case for more
than a year and took great care in preparing the report . .. ."
The CDC's report relied upon DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid]
analysis, which traced the patient's strain of the virus to the
doctor.8 1
The article continued, "[T]he CDC stated that DNA assay
revealed that the dentist's and patient's viral sequences dis-
played the extent of similarity expected for epidemiologically
linked individuals. 'Unique patterns of nucleotide not found in
any other virus isolate examined were shared between viral se-
quences found in the dentist and the patient.' ",82 Summarizing
the report, Gerald Myers, Ph.D., of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, concluded that the serologic evidence provided
"very powerful" proof of a relationship between the two viral
76. See Sanford F. Kuvin, AIDS Testing: Make it Mandatory, NEWSDAY (Nassau,
Suffolk), July 19, 1991, at 67.
77. See supra note 6.
78. Gerbert, supra note 73, at 1847.
79. Id. at 1846-48.
80. Id. at 1847.
81. Id. at 1847-48. The DNA analysis is accomplished through tests using PCR, or
polymerase chain reaction. Garrett, supra note 67, at 4. PCR allows scientists to compare
DNA, the genetic sequences, of viral samples to look for similarities. Id. The CDC used
PCR analysis for the first time in the Bergalis case, and the analysis showed that Acer
and Bergalis were infected with strains of HIV that vary genetically by only 1.2 percent.
Id. This small variation is within the margin of error allowable for the tests, which led
the CDC to conclude that the two strains of HIV were identical. Id. HIV is a rapidly
mutating virus, and such close genetic matches between HIV strains have only been
found where one individual directly infected the other. Id.
82. Gerbert, supra note 73, at 1847-48.
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strains.9 3 The CDC could not claim absolute certainty, given
that conclusions in scientific studies usually rest upon "hypothe-
sized relationships and probabilities"; but the authors said, "the
CDC was as certain as it could ever be ....
Since publication of the Acer cases, calls for reform have
been made, most notably by Senator Jesse Helms of North Car-
olina, 6 and by Kimberly Bergalis herself."6 These have been met
with the heated criticism of activists who see many of the pro-
posals as unreasoned overreactions, whose impact will be overly
broad and whose aims are draconian. 7 Although such extreme
measures ss may be inappropriate, patients continue to be con-
83. Id. at 1848 (citations omitted).
84. Id.
85. In July, 1991, Senator Helms (R-N.C.) proposed that HCWs who, without in-
forming their patients, continue to perform invasive procedures after they have AIDS be
fined up to $10,000 or be imprisoned for up to ten years, or both. See Martin Tolchin,
Senate Adopts Tough Measures on Health Workers with AIDS, N.Y. ThIES, July 19,
1991, at Al; Jessie Mangliman, Health Workers Denounce Helms Measure, NEWSDAY
(city ed.), July 20, 1991, at 14.
86. Philip J. Hilts, AIDS Patient Urges Congress to Pass Testing Bill, N.Y. TmEs,
Sept. 27, 1991, at A12. Bergalis appeared before Congress on September 26, 1991 to
plead for legislation to prevent a recurrence of her painful ordeal. Id. Visibly weakened
by her illness, she addressed Congress for only fifteen seconds, stating, "AIDS is a terri-
ble disease that we must take seriously. I didn't do anything wrong, but I'm being made
to suffer like this. My life has been taken away. Please enact legislation so other patients
and health care providers don't have to go through the hell that I have. Thank you." Id.
Several months before, in April of 1991, Bergalis wrote a letter to the Florida health
officials, portions of which ran as follows:
When I was diagnosed with AIDS in December of '89, I was only 21 years old. It
was the shock of my life .... I was infected by Dr. Acer in 1987. My life has been
sheer hell .... AIDS has slowly destroyed me. Unless a cure is found, I will be
another one of your statistics soon ....
Who do I blame? Do I blame myself? I sure don't. I never used IV drugs, never
slept with anyone and never had a blood transfusion. I blame Dr. Acer and every
single one of you bastards. Anyone that knew Dr. Acer was infected and had full-
blown AIDS and stood by not doing a damn thing about it. You are all just as
guilty as he was ....
If laws are not formed to provide protection, then my suffering and death was in
vain .... I'm dying guys. Goodbye.
Kantrowitz, supra note 61, at 52 (quoting letter by Kimberly Bergalis written April 6,
1991). Bergalis, 23, died on Sunday, December 8, 1991. Kimberly Bergalis, 23; Got AIDS
from Dentist, CHL Tim., Dec. 9, at 91, at C6.
87. Mangliman, supra note 85, at 14. "'What the [Helms bill] is doing is pandering
to panic by using [a) jail sentence,' said Kenneth Raskey, president of the Greater New
York Hospital Association ... ." Mangaliman, supra note 85, at 14.
88. See supra note 85.
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cerned with the prospect of HCW to patient transmission.
C. Informed Consent - A Tort Law Concept:
A less imposing solution, which finds its support in long-
standing tort law,89 is rooted in the doctrine of informed con-
sent. 0 While much of the medical community denies that ob-
taining the patient's informed consent is necessary,91 for some
medical experts,92 most of the public," and many of our nation's
89. See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845
(1974). "Suits charging failure by a physician adequately to disclose the risks and alter-
natives of proposed treatment are not innovations in American law." Id. at 419. "The
first buds of court decisions heralding this new medical duty" can be found in a 1957
California case. See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979) (citing Salgo v.
Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. App. 1957)).
90. "The doctrine imposes a duty on a physician or surgeon to inform a patient of
his options and their attendant risks. If a physician breaches this duty, patient's consent
is defective, and physician is responsible for the consequences." Scott v. Bradford, 606
P.2d at 557 (Okla. 1979). Scott noted, "This requirement, labeled 'informed consent,' is,
legally speaking, as essential as a physician's care and skill in the performance of the
therapy." Id. (emphasis in original).
91. For instance, a 1987 news article quoted the Surgeon General, C. Everett Koop,
as saying that mandatory testing would be too expensive and ineffective and would sub-
ject AIDS victims "to discrimination that could jeopardize 'housing, jobs and friend-
ships."' Sondra G. Boodman, Koop: Mandatory Tests Would Harm AIDS Fight, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 2, 1987, at A3.
92. See Kantrowitz, supra note 61, at 54. That article quoted Dr. Sanford Kuvin,
Vice Chairman of the National Foundation for Infectious Diseases in Washington, D.C.,
as saying:
The inherent right to know - for patient and doctors alike - always has to su-
persede confidentiality .... The doctor doesn't have to put up a signboard, but
there has to be informed consent if he is going to do invasive procedures. 'First, do
no harm' is the absolute bedrock of medicine. The Kimberly Bergalises of this
world are avoidable.
Id.
93. Surveys of the American public have shown that employment policies for in-
fected HCWs are of great import to most patients. One such survey showed that roughly
80% of the American public felt that HIV infected physicians have a duty to disclose
their infection to their patients. Furthermore, almost 60% of the public would bar a
surgeon with AIDS from practice, and over 50% would likewise exclude an infected den-
tist or dental hygienist Barnes, supra note 9, at 311 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
A Gallup poll, conducted for NEwswEEK in June of 1991, estimated that 95% of the
public felt that surgeons should he required to disclose their seropositivity to their pa-
tients, 94% felt that all physicians should have to disclose, 94% also felt all dentists
should disclose, and 90% felt that all health care workers should have to inform their
patients of seropositivity. Kantrowitz, supra note 61, at 51.
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legislators,9' this simple measure is the only logical, legal, and
ethical solution.
The doctrine of informed consent is an outgrowth of the
more basic doctrine of patient consent, "the universally recog-
nized rule that a physician, treating a mentally competent adult
under non-emergency circumstances, cannot properly undertake
to perform surgery or administer other therapy without the prior
consent of his patient."95
Initially, courts recognized the need for a patient's volun-
tary consent prior to medical treatment because,-as Judge Car-
dozo stated in the oft quoted New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital," "[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body. '9 7 The Schloendorff
rationale focused on an individual's right to choose to undergo
or forego a given treatment. Without an individual's authoriza-
94. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
95. Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Md. 1977) (citing Mohr v. Williams, 104
N.W. 12, 15 (Minn. 1905); McClees v. Cohen, 148 A. 124, 127 (Md. 1930); Powell, Con-
sent to Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L. REv. 189 (1961)).
While the duty to illicit a patient's informed consent has traditionally bound only
physicians, the arguments that support its application to HIV-infected physicians extend
equally to non-physician HCWs as well.
In some emergency situations, obtaining patient consent will be impracticable or
impossible, and the law will recognize an exception to the consent requirement. See, e.g.,
Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Cir. 1970); Sard, 379 A.2d at 1022. "[T]he
physician's duty to disclose is suspended where an emergency of such gravity and ur-
gency exists that it is impractical to obtain the patient's consent." Id.
Other exceptions to the consent requirement have been recognized. As the Sard
court put it, "We stress that a physician is not burdened with the duty of divulging all
risks, but only those which are material .... Even then, the physician retains a qualified
privilege to withhold information on therapeutic grounds ... ." Id. Exceptions have been
recognized in the following situations: (1) where the physician determines that candid
disclosure would be detrimental to the patient's physical or psychological well-being, (2)
where the patient is incapable of giving consent because of mental incapacity or infancy;
(3) where the patient has requested that he not be told of risks; (4) where an emergency
exists; (5) where the risk is known to the patient or is so obvious as to justify presump-
tion of knowledge; (6) where there exists a relatively remote risk in performing a com-
mon procedure, but it is common knowledge that such inherent risk has only a low inci-
dence; and (7) where the physician does not know of a risk and, in the exercise of
ordinary care, he should not have been aware of it. Id. at 1022-23.
96. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
97. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93; See Sard, 379 A.2d at 1019; Karp v. Cooley, 493
F.2d 408, 419 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974); Dunham v. Wright, 423
F.2d 940, 942, n.1 (3d Cir. 1970).
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tion, or consent, a physician cannot give treatment 98
Mohr v. Williams,9 a 1905 Minnesota case, is also illustra-
tive of the consent doctrine. In that case, the plaintiff, Anna
Mohr, had consented to an operation on her right ear.100 When,
in the course of treatment, the physician determined that her
left ear actually needed the treatment, he operated on the left
ear instead.10 1 Despite the fact that the operation on the left ear
was done with the proper degree of skill and care, the Minnesota
court found for plaintiff Mohr, holding that the physician should
have gotten plaintiff's consent for the work on the left ear. 102
Express consent to the particular procedure was necessary.'0 "
Once consent is given, a physician is authorized, through a con-
tractual theory, to "operate to the extent of the consent given,
but no further."104 Because the defendant physician had ex-
ceeded the bounds of his patient's consent, the physician was
liable to his patient for wrongful assault and battery."5
The phrase used in Mohr to limit authorized treatment "to
the extent of the consent given, but no further"106 raises ques-
tions about the scope of consent necessary to constitute valid
authorization. What, exactly, has a patient consented to? Is his
consent invalid if it is uninformed? If so, how much information
does he need for the consent to be "informed" and, therefore,
valid?
In answering these questions, courts 'have focused on the
bottom-line notions that support the consent doctrine: patient
autonomy, contractual obligations, and fiduciary principles.107
Generally, courts will find valid consent only where disclosure
has been made about the patient's options, risks, and the rela-
tive odds of success of the proposed treatment.108 As the Court
98. Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
99. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
100. Id. at 13.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 14.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id. at 16.
106. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
107. See infra notes 97-98, 110-18 and accompanying text.
108. Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 419 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Scott v. Wilson, 396
S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), afl'd, 412 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1967)). See also Sard,
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated, "True consent to what
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of choice, and that
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options
available and the risks attendant upon each." ' What has devel-
oped is the modern doctrine of informed consent.
In addition to the notions of individual autonomy, which
underlie Cardozo's decision in Schloendorff, the doctrine of in-
formed consent has been further justified by courts that focus on
the "contractual" nature, or the "fiducial quality," of the physi-
cian-patient relationship.110 According to this line of reasoning,
"the contract authorizing surgical procedure [does] not authorize
operations 'involving risks and results not contemplated.' ,,,
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania discussed the contractual
nature of the relationship in Gray v. Grunnagle,112 where the
court embraced the views asserted by Robert E. Powell in an
article entitled, Consent to Operative Procedures."" The court
quoted Powell, as follows:
In order to understand the nature of consent it is necessary at the
outset to have some understanding of the legal relationship be-
tween the physician and his patient. This relationship is essen-
tially contractual in nature .... More often than not the contract
is raised by implication from the dealings between the parties,
and in a like manner the acts to be performed by the parties are
impliedly defined .... In short, the surgeon must operate in ac-
cordance with the agreement made between the parties. Consent
for the operation or treatment arises from the contract and is
379 A.2d at 1020.
If a patient's decision is to be a knowing and intelligent one, he must understand
in addition to the risks of the suggested surgery, the possible results of the failure
to chance it. A complete understanding of the consequences of foregoing the oper-
ation would seem necessarily to include a consideration of the alternative treat-
ment for the patient's disease or condition.
Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 944 (3rd Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted).
109. Karp, 493 F.2d at 419 (footnote omitted). See also Dunham, 423 F.2d at 945
(citing Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (Pa. 1966)).
110. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1019.1020 (citing Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 860
(Wash. 1974), afl'd per curiam, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975); Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d
520, 524 (N.M. 1962)).
111. Dunham, 423 F.2d at 944, n.6 (quoting Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th
Cir. 1943)).
112. 223 A.2d 663, 669 (Pa. 1966).




given only in connection with what the parties understood was to
be done .... 114
In line with the reasoning in Gray, four years later the Federal
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, concluded, "it is not the
prerogative of the physician to keep secret and screen out any of
the possible complications of surgery.' ' u 5
Finally, the consent doctrine recognizes that most patients,
untrained in the medical field, are not aware of the benefits and
risks posed by various forms of treatment."" In most cases, the
patient relies on his physician for the information on which he
bases his decision to undergo or forego treatment.117 "Because of
the unequal distribution of knowledge between professionals on
the one hand and patients . . . on the other, the principle of
respect for autonomy entails that professionals have a prima fa-
cie obligation to disclose information, to ensure understanding
and voluntariness, and to foster adequate decision making." '
The controversy about how much information is enough to
support a valid patient consent has spawned two alternate stan-
dards for determining the proper scope of disclosure - the pro-
fessional and the lay standards.1 9 The professional standard,
the older of the two, allows the medical community to define the
standards as to what information should be passed on to pa-
tients. 20 According to this view, the doctor's "duty to inform is
akin to his standard of competence, that is, measured by the
medical standards and customs in the community.112 This stan-
dard, therefore, "compels a physician to disclose facts which a
reasonable medical practitioner in a similar community and of
the same school or medical thought would have disclosed to his
114. Gray, 223 A.2d at 669 (quoting Powell, supra note 63, at 191) (footnote omitted
in original).
115. Dunham, 423 F.2d at 944-45 (footnote omitted).
116. See Sard, 379 A.2d at 1020 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972)).
117. Id.
118. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES Op BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
73 (3rd ed. 1989).
119. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-59 (Okla. 1980) (comparing the
two approaches).
120. See, e.g., Small v. Gifford Memorial Hospital, 349 A.2d 703, 705 (Vt. 1975);
Starnes v. Taylor, 158 S.E.2d 339 (N.C. 1968); Roberts v. Young, 119 N.W.2d 627 (Mich.
1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965).
121. Small, 349 A.2d at 705.
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patient regarding the proposed treatment. '122 Under this view,
in order to show a breach of the duty to disclose, a patient must
produce expert medical testimony to show that a defendant doc-
tor's disclosures did not conform with the accepted customs and
practices of the local medical community. 12 1
The newer alternative, the lay standard,12 ' does not focus on
what the medical community deems appropriate disclosure; in-
stead, its emphasis is on the level of disclosure which the patient
would find necessary to his ability to make an intelligent
choice. 25 Thus, the inquiry is into what information the doctor
knew (or should have known) his patient, as a reasonable lay-
person, would want to know before making his decision.126
Proponents of the professional standard argue that physi-
cians cannot be held to a lay or general standard of care because
a lay standard would mandate a broader scope of disclosure, and
this would interfere with the "flexibility" a physician requires to
best suit his patient's needs.1 27 However, this older professional
standard has met an increasing barrage of criticism.128 Many
courts have discarded the professional standard for the general
or lay standard.1 29 For example, in Sard v. Hardy,5 0 the Mary-
122. Karp, 493 F.2d at 419 n.11.
123. See Sard, 379 A.2d at 1021; Karp, 493 F.2d at 420; Small, 349 A.2d at 705.
124. The lay standard has also been called the "reasonable person standard," be-
cause the "determination of informational needs is shifted from the physician to the
patient ... " BEAUCHAMP & CHLDRESS, supra note 118, at 89. Under this standard, the
reference is "to a hypothetical reasonable person." Id.
125. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1980).
126. See, e.g., Sard, 379 A.2d at 1021-22; Smdll, 349 A.2d at 705; Karp, 493 F.2d at
419, n.11 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (U.S. App. D.C. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073, 1076-77 (D. Idaho 1973)
(citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972)).
127. Compare Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905, 909-910 (Miss. 1970) (discussing a
surgeon's concern for the "best possible treatment" of illness, not preparation for "de-
fense of a possible lawsuit") with Butler v. Berkeley, 213 S.E.2d 571, 581-82 (N.C. 1975)
(emphasizing that the fear of lawsuit under lay standard would render the doctor unable
to "give the best interest of his patient primary importance").
128. BEAUCHAMP & CRmL.DiSS, supra note 118, at 88. "Although many legal jurisdic-
tions in the United States have retained the more traditional professional practice stan-
dard, the reasonable person standard [or lay standard] has gained acceptance in perhaps
60 percent of the states in the United States." Id.
129. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1021 (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 688 (R.I.
1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852 (Wash. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 530 P.2d 334
(1975); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d at 653 (1974)). See also
23
PACE LAW REVIEW
land Court of Appeals joined what it called "an ever-expanding
number of courts" that declined to accept the older view. 131 In
doing so, the court stated:
These decisions recognize that protection of the patient's funda-
mental right of physical self-determination - the very corner-
stone of the informed consent doctrine - mandates that the
scope of a physician's duty to disclose therapeutic risks and alter-
natives be governed by the patient's informational needs. Thus,
the appropriate test is not what the physician in the exercise of
his medical judgment thinks a patient should know before acqui-
escing in a proposed course of treatment; rather, the focus is on
what data the patient requires in order to make an intelligent
decision.1 32
The professional standard has been criticized because it
seems to contradict the basic notions of the consent doc-
trine - namely, the right of the individual patient to make his
own choices about which risks he is willing to face.133 For in-
stance, the Sard court contended,
It is indeed questionable whether a professional standard of dis-
closure can be said to exist at all. But even where it may exist, it
is apt to be so vague and nebulous as to endow the medical com-
munity with virtually absolute discretion in fixing the standard
for adequate disclosure .... As the California Supreme Court
stated in Cobbs v. Grant: "Unlimited discretion in the physician
is irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 118, at 88.
130. 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977).
131. Id. at 1021. One article focused on this new, "sharpened" concept of "informed
consent":
Starting with the proposition that physicians must seek and secure the patient's
consent before commencing treatment - a reflection of the fundamental ethical
principle of autonomy - courts have inquired into the standards for determining
whether consent was properly obtained. This inquiry has given rise to the rule in a
number of state courts that the adequacy of consent should be determined from
the viewpoint of the reasonable patient rather than from that of prevailing medi-
cal practice.
Sheila Jasanoff, Biology and the Bill of Rights: Can Science Reframe the Constitution?,
13 Am. J. L. AND MED. 249, 258 (1987) (citations omitted).
132. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1021.
133. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 118, at 88. "Perhaps the chief objection to
the professional practice standard is that it can undermine the patient's right of autono-
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ultimate informed decision regarding the course of treatment to
which he knowledgeably consents to be subjected."'3
The newer view, the lay standard, takes into account (and
protects the patient from) what some courts have called a poten-
tial "conspiracy of silence" among the members of the medical
community. 13 5 The courts have recognized the possibility that,
unless it is held to a general standard of care, the medical com-
munity might be inclined to protect its own by testifying only to
a very narrow scope of "customary" disclosure.3 8 "Under that
standard, earlier decisions seemed to perpetuate medical pater-
nalism by giving the profession sweeping authority to decide
unilaterally what is in the patient's best interests.'13 7 The conse-
quence of the old rule is that many cases fail because plaintiffs
often cannot present a prima facie case that the doctors deviated
from medical custom.13 8 "As a rule, it is ... [criticized] because
it lets the medical profession set its own standards for informing
patients."'3 9
Even under the lay standard, questions remained as to ex-
actly how much information was "enough" for the "reasonable"
patient to make an "intelligent" decision. This, too, raised de-
bate; but the consensus appears to be that an intelligent decision
requires disclosure of all of the "material" facts. 40 "Materiality"
has been variously defined by the courts.14 ' In all of the defini-
134. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1021 (quoting Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. Sup. Ct
1972)).
135. See, e.g., Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. 1971).
136. E.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (R.I. 1972) (discussing the reluc-
tance of physician experts to jeopardize malpractice insurance when testifying).
137. Scott, 606 P.2d at 557.
138. Small, 349 A.2d at 705.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Sard, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1977); Small, 349 A.2d 703, 706 (Vt. 1975);
Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F.Supp. 1073, 1076-77 (D. Idaho 1973); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I. 1972); Cobbs. v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Ca. 1972); Getchell v.
Mansfield, 489 P.2d 953, 956 (1971); See also Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent
to Therapy, 64 Nw. UL. REv. 628, 640 (1970) (concluding that the doctrine of informed
consent will force the physician to behave as both a reasonable doctor and a reasonable
man).
141. See, e.g., Scott, 606 P.2d at 558 ("What is reasonable disclosure in one instance
may not be reasonable in another .... [F]ull disclosure of all material risks incident to
treatment must be made. There is no bright line separating the material from the im-
material; it is a question of fact. A risk is material if it would be likely to affect pa-




tions, though, "materiality" is generally understood to mean in-
formation that a "physician knows or ought to know would be
significant to a reasonable person in the patient's position in de-
ciding whether or not to submit to a particular medical treat-
ment. 1 42 In other words, "when a reasonable person in the pa-
tient's position probably would attach significance to the specific
risk in deciding on treatment, the risk is material and must be
disclosed." 141 The general standard of reference is, therefore, one
of reasonableness, and not of medical custom.
144
There are some courts, however, that have declined to em-
brace fully either of the two standards - professional or lay.
45
Rather, these courts have chosen to fashion a compromise ap-
proach, pulling something from each. For instance, in Riedinger
v. Colburn, 14 a federal district court in Idaho analyzed and ac-
cepted the Supreme Court of California's approach to the scope
of disclosure issue, as expressed in Cobbs v. Grant.'47 Riedinger
explored what the California court had termed a "duty of rea-
sonable disclosure.' 14 The professional standard of care was
considered too broad because "[tihe Cobbs court [recognized]
the inherent impropriety in permitting the medical profession to
make what may be a patient's non-medical decision .... Yet,
full disclosure of every conceivable risk - such as risks that
would not threaten death or serious bodily harm - was like-
wise found to be impractical. 50
The solution the Cobbs court prescribed was as follows.
where a complicated surgical process is to be performed, a doc-
tor must, at a minimum, make his patient aware of any and all
known risks which could potentially cause death or serious bod-
ily harm.' 51 Beyond that minimum warning, a doctor has a duty
to follow the community standards and reveal "such additional
142. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1022.
143. Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 863 (Wash. 1974), afl'd per curiam, 530 P.2d
334 (Wash. 1975).
144. Sard, 379 A.2d at 1022 (1977).
145. See supra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
146. 361 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Idaho 1973).
147. 502 P.2d 1 (Ca. 1972).
148. Id. at 10.
149. Riedinger, 361 F. Supp. at 1076.
150. Id. at 1076-77.
151. Id. at 1077.
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information as a skilled practitioner of good standing would pro-
vide under similar circumstances."1 2 Essentially, then, the Rie-
dinger - Cobbs solution is a hybrid, or an aggregate of the two
more extreme views. Presumably, even under this compromise
solution - the Cobbs hybrid formula - the risk of transmis-
sion of HIV would have to be disclosed to patients, given the
current lack of a cure for the virus. It is a risk which could po-
tentially cause death or serious bodily harm.
In a recent New Jersey case, Estate of Behringer v. The
Medical Center at Princeton,53 a Superior Court judge focused
on the implications of the doctrine of informed consent for an
HIV-infected HCW.'5 4 The judge upheld the actions of the Med-
ical Center at Princeton, which suspended the surgical privileges
of Dr. William Behringer, an ear, nose, and throat specialist who
practiced at the Center until 1987, when he was found to have
AIDS.155 The judge wrote, "The ultimate risk to the patient is so
absolute, so devastating, that it is untenable to argue against in-
formed consent combined with a restriction on procedures which
present 'any risk' to the patient."1 56 He also noted, "If there is to
be an ultimate arbiter of whether the patient is to be treated
invasively by an AIDS-positive surgeon, the arbiter will be the
fully informed patient."'5 7 Behringer evinces New Jersey's ad-
herence to the lay standard in informed consent dilemmas.
D. Current CDC Guidelines and Recent Federal Legislative
Efforts
With the July, 1990 CDC report of the Acer-Bergalis case,158
the eyes and ears of the public and of the health care commu-
nity were on the federal government - the former looking for
quick and decisive reform that would prevent a recurrence, and
the latter cringing with the apprehension of a legislative re-
sponse that could potentially restrict the practices of individual
HCWs. In turn, the federal government essentially turned its
152. Id. at 1076-77 (quoting Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11).
153. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. 1991).
154. Id. at 1254.
155. Id. at 1283.
156. Id.
157. Id. (emphasis added).




eyes and ears for guidance to its health experts in the CDC. In
July 1991, the CDC promulgated guidelines,21 9 which were
quickly faced with the strong criticism of medical societies and
interest groups.16 The guidelines suggested the following: (1)
that HCWs volunteer, on an individual basis, to be tested for
HIV; (2) that the HCW who has volunteered and who subse-
quently learns he or she is seropositive must obtain the informed
consent of his or her patients before performing certain invasive
procedures; (3) that the seropositive HCW refrain from perform-
ing certain "exposure-prone" procedures; (4) that the states es-
tablish local medical advisory boards in health care facilities,
whose function it would be to review, on a case by case basis, the
practice, health, and capacity of individual HIV-positive health
care employees and to assess what, if any, additional limitations
should be placed on the HCW's patient contacts; and (5) that
the medical and dental boards in the states compile a listing of
the specific invasive procedures which, by their nature, are
deemed to be "exposure prone," or pose a higher risk of HIV
exposure to the patient."16 These riskier procedures would be
off-limits to those HCWs who are aware of their seropositive
status.162
The significance of the July CDC guidelines was elevated, at
least for a time, by Congressional legislation. 3 Congress voted
into law a requirement that each of the 50 states adopt the CDC
guidelines as state law or implement a "comparable" or
"equivalent" plan (which would require the endorsement of the
head of the CDC) if the state wishes to receive certain federal
159. CDC, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Pro-
cedures, 266 JAMA 771, 774-76 (1991) (hereinafter CDC Recommendations]. The July
guidelines are, however, currently under reformulation, due to the protests of organized
medicine against the CDC's July guidelines. See Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Backs Off on
Plan to Restrict Health Workers with AIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMEs, December 3, 1991, at Al;
B.D. Colen, Limits Dropped on HIV Doctors, NEWSDAY (Nassau), December 5, 1991, at
145. As of the date of this writing, the new guidelines are still in draft and have not been
publicly introduced. Id.
160. See Laurie Garrett, Docs Confront Feds on AIDS Rules, NEWSDAY (City), No-
vember 4, 1991, at 15. See also infra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
161. CDC Recommendations, supra note 159, at 775.
162. Id.
163. § 633, "Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act,
1992," 102 P.L. 141, 1991 H.R. 2622, 105 Stat. 834, 102d Cong. (Oct. 28, 1991).
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assistance."" '
This wording is somewhat vague, and has allowed for flexi-
ble interpretation.6 5 Some states, urged by medical groups and
AIDS activists, were quick to take advantage of this.6'6 "Having
failed to dissuade Congress from passing such legislation, AIDS
activists and the nation's leading medical societies have shifted
their hopes to narrowly defining 'exposure-prone procedures'
and 'equivalent programs,' in the hopes that the law can be im-
plemented with minimal restrictions on medical profession-
als. 11 7 For instance, as early as October 8, 1991, New York State
announced its intention to refuse to draw up a list of "risk-
prone" procedures, arguing that its plan for standard hygienic
and safety precautions would suffice to control the spread of
HIV.168 Michigan and California followed suit, and other states
were reported to be considering the New York plan. 69
What has resulted has been several months of battles and,
eventually, compromise between officials at the CDC and repre-
sentatives of organized medicine.170 As of the date of this writ-
ing, the CDC, "overwhelmed" by the protests of organized
medicine, is revamping its July guidelines. 17' The CDC appar-
ently intends to strike the requirement for lists of "exposure-
164. Id. Section 633 provides, in part: "[E]ach State Public Health Official shall, not
later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, certify to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services that guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control, or
guidelines which are equivalent to those promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control
concerning recommendations for preventing the transmission of the human immu-
nodeficiency virus and the hepatitis B virus during exposure prone invasive procedures,
except for emergency situations when the patient's life or limb is in danger, have been
instituted in the State." Id. (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., Kevin Sack, Albany Plans to Allow Surgery by Doctors With the
AIDS Virus, N.Y. Tnirs, Oct. 9, 1991, at 1. "[T]he definition of equivalency was left
vague, and apparently will be determined by the director of the Centers for Disease Con-
trol, said Jeffrey Levi, director of governmental affairs for the AIDS Action Council in
Washington." Id.
166. See Garrett, supra note 160, at 15.
167. Id. at 15.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See infra notes 172-75.
171. Altman, supra note 148. The revised guidelines will have to be approved by Dr.





prone" invasive procedures 17 1 and focus, instead, upon case-by-
case analysis of infected workers. 17 This new focus represents a
weakening of the CDC's stance, which leaves the HIV-infected
HCW relatively unscathed because it permits subjective applica-
tion.17 4 As one writer put it, "[a]fter coming under attack from
most of organized medicine and the AIDS community, the
[CDC] has reversed its position and decided to place virtually
no limitations on the medical practice of HIV-infected health
care professionals. 1 7
While the new guidelines, when formally announced, will
most likely appease those who would leave unrestricted the
HIV-infected HCW,'7 "[it is not immediately clear what effect,
if any, the agency's action will have on legislative efforts to limit
the practice of infected health workers. 1 7 Notably, Mr. Mike
Franc, legislative counsel to Representative William Dan-
nemeyer, 178 was reported as saying that the new version of the
guidelines will be so vague that infected HCWs "can go ahead
and do whatever they want. ' 17 9 According to Franc, the CDC's
re-drafting will now "allow Mr. Dannemeyer and those who
would support a mandatory testing approach to argue that what
is needed is a system that is going to guarantee that those who
are infected are accountable to their patients and the local
panels."1 0
Not surprisingly, on January 5, 1992, Mr. Dannemeyer and
a number of his fellow representatives 8 1 re-sponsored a bill to
172. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
173. Altman, supra note 159; see also Colen, supra note 159, at 145.
174. Colen, supra note 159, at 145.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. For instance, Jeff Levi, Government Affairs Director of a Washington lobby
group, the AIDS Action Council, was pleased with the CDC changes and was quoted as
saying, "I think what it means is the CDC is finally letting science, rather than politics,
drive their policy making." Colen, supra note 159, at 145.
177. Altman, supra note 159, at Al.
178. Representative Dannemeyer (R.-Cal.) is an advocate of mandatory testing for
doctors. Colen, supra note 159. Dannemeyer is the sponsor of a bill currently before
Congress, which addresses the risk of HIV transmission in the health care setting. For a
more complete discussion of the bill, see infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
179. Colen, supra note 159.
180. Id. (emphasis added). See infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
181. Mr. Dannemeyer, for himself, Mr. Bliley, Mr. Holloway, Mr. Barton of Texas,
Mr. Dornan of California, Mr. Inhofe, Mr. Lagomarsino, and Mr. Burton of Indiana,
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be known as the "Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Pro-
vider Protection Act of 1991. ' 1182 The bill, portions of which are
reproduced in the footnote below,9s states as its purpose,
introduced the bill, which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Additional Sponsors were: Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Lewis of Florida, Mr. Doolittle, Mr.
Taylor of North Carolina, Mr. Myers of Indiana, Mr. Riggs, Mr. Hancock, Mr. Hyde, Mr.
Fawell, Mr. Delay Mr. Armey, Mr. Herger, Mrs. Bentley, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Packard,
Mr. Duncan, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Fields, and Mr. Crane. H.R. 2788, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
182. The bill, Version 2, as re-sponsored on January 5, 1992, is to be cited as the
"Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Provider Protection Act of 1991." It was intro-
duced originally on June 26, 1991 in the House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
183. The following are excerpted portions of 1992 H.R. 2788, Version 2, dated Janu-
ary 5, 1992:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
This Act may be cited as the "Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Provider Pro-
tection Act of 1991".
TITLE I-AMENDMENTS TO PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT REGARDING
CERTAIN COMMUNICABLE DISEASES AMONG HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
AND PATIENTS
SEC. 101. ESTABLISHMENT IN TITLE XXVI IN PROGRAM FOR EARLY IN-
TERVENTION SERVICES.
Subpart I of part C of title XXVI of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300ff-
41 et seq.), as added by section 301(a) of Public Law 101-381 (104 Stat. 597), is amended
by inserting after section 2648 the following new sections:
"SEC. 2648A. PROTECTION OF PATIENTS FROM HEALTH CARE PROVID-
ERS WITH CERTAIN COMMUNICABLE DISEASES.
"(a) LIST OF RELEVANT DISEASES AND MEDICAL PROCEDURES.-For pur-
poses of the requirement established in subsection (b) regarding the receipt by a State of
a grant under section 2641, the Secretary-
"(1) shall establish a list identifying each communicable disease that poses a risk
to the public health (which list shall include HIV disease and hepatitis B, subject to
subsection (d)(3));
"(2) in the case of each disease included on the list, shall specify (as a component
of the list) the medical and dental procedures that a health care provider with such a
disease should be prohibited from performing on the basis that performing the proce-
dure on an individual would pose a risk of the transmission of the disease from the
health care provider to the individual;
"(3) in the case of any medical or dental procedure specified for purposes of para-
graph (2), shall specify (as a component of the list) the particular health professions
and allied health professions whose practitioners perform the procedure;
"(4) in the case of a health care provider who performs any medical or dental proce-
dure specified for purposes of paragraph (2), shall specify (as a component of the list)
the frequency of testing for each of such diseases that the provider should undergo for
purposes of protecting the public health . ...
"(b) REQUIREMENTS REGARDING PROTECTION FROM RELEVANT DIS-
EASES.-Subject to subsection (f), for fiscal year 1992 and subsequent fiscal years, the
Secretary may not make a grant under section 2641 to a State for a fiscal year unless-
31
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To amend title XXVI of the Public Health Service Act to provide
for the establishment of protections against certain communicable
diseases for both health care providers and the patients of such
providers, and to provide for certain forms of assistance for such
providers and patients. 8
4
The portions of the bill which are highlighted represent the
sponsors' hopes to establish a more uniform, "bright line" rule
for dealing with HIV-infection in the health care setting.185
While the bill is pending before the House Energy and Com-
merce Committee1 6 and its future is as yet uncertain, it is surely
representative of the "other side of the coin" - the argument
that the CDC guidelines are not unduly restrictive, but in fact
they are not restrictive enough to meet the threat.1 8 7
"(1) in the case of any health care provider who performs any medical or dental
procedure included on the list under subsection (a) (as in effect for the fiscal year)-
"(A) the State requires that each such provider undergo testing for each disease
with respect to which the procedure is so included; and
"(B) the State requires each such provider to undergo the testing as frequently as
necessary to be in compliance with the applicable recommendation included on the list
pursuant to paragraph (4) of such subsection;
"(2) in the case of any health care provider determined through testing pursuant to
paragraph (1) to have any such disease-
"(A) the State prohibits the provider from performing the medical or dental proce-
dure involved for the duration of the disease, except in circumstances in which the
provider-
"(i) informs the patient involved that the provider has the disease;
"(ii) informs the patient of the risk posed by the disease in the context of the
procedure; and
"(iii) obtains the written consent of the patient for the provider to perform the
procedure notwithstanding such risk;...
"(3) HIV DISEASE AND HEPATITIS.-HIV disease and hepatitis B shall each be
considered to be a communicable disease that poses a risk to the public health for
purposes of the list required under subsection (a), as in effect for each of the fiscal
years 1992 through 1994....
H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (emphasis added).
184. H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
185. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
186. Referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee on June 26, 1991. 137
Cong. Rec. H 5209. (Lnxis Legis library, Billtracking file).
187. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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E. The Polarization of Views
Both the CDC's guidelines of July, 1991 and the legislative
efforts since that date have taken their share of criticism.188
Some critics deem the CDC's July guidelines and federal law
overly intrusive and restrictive. 189 This view is generally champi-
oned by staunch civil libertarians and by much of the medical
community. Their criticisms include the following: (1) that the
CDC and the Congress are acting only to pacify an hysterical
and uninformed public;190 (2) that the seropositive HCWs
should not be forced, in the name of public health, to disclose
the small risk of infection since the Acer cases e1 ' are the only
documented cases of HCW to patient transmissions;1 9 2 (3) that
restrictions on the practices of seropositive HCWs will discour-
age healthy HCWs from treating seropositive patients, for fear
that they, too, will be infected and then lose their livelihoods;193
(4) that attempts to restrict the rights of seropositive individuals
are fueled only by long-standing contempt for homosexuals, who
make up the great percentage of AIDS victims;19 ' (5) that rigor-
ous application of universal precautions 95 is the best solution to
the risk of transmission of HIV in the health care setting; 98 and
(6) that a mandatory testing scheme will be ineffective, since the
potential time lapse between HIV infection and the appearance
of the HIV antibodies could result in false negative test results,
which would lull the infected worker into a false sense of secur-
ity and thereby increase the risk to patients.1 97
The contrasting view - that the guidelines and law are in-
188. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 160 (discussing a November 4, 1991 meeting of
representatives of the nation's medical and public health organizations, where federal
guidelines were deemed "unworkable and overly restrictive").
189. Id. at 15.
190. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 6, 70-84 and accompanying text.
192. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
193. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
195. Universal precautions include infection control procedures such as appropriate
hand washing, appropriate use and disposal of needles and other sharp instruments, in-
cluding proper disinfectant and sterilization. CDC, Recommendations, supra note 159, at
774-76.
196. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.




sufficient to address the threat - is generally held by those
who believe the potential of transmission is more real and seri-
ous than the health care community and civil rights activists
would have us believe.19 8 While recognizing that the July guide-
lines and the federal legislative efforts are steps in the right di-
rection, these critics find: (1) that the CDC should not be inhib-
ited by the admittedly small number of documented HCW to
patient transmissions because the scientific reality of the risk is
undeniable and transmission is likely to occur again;199 (2) that,
given the undeniable gaps in science's understanding of the HIV
virus, the government should err on the side of caution, hoping
for the best, but allowing for the worst;2 00 (3) that so-called
"universal precautions" cannot realistically be universally ap-
plied and are, therefore, not the answer; 0 1 (4) that the interests
of the few infected HCWs are not paramount to the state inter-
est in public health and the individual patient's interest in mak-
ing an informed decision about a risk that could prove to be
deadly;202 (5) that the medical community's denial of the risk of
transmission is to be taken with a grain of salt, in light of the
fact that an admission of risk would be counter to the interests
and autonomy of the medical community;203 and (6) that the
CDC's advocacy of voluntary testing is an idealistic, but unreal-
istic solution, as those individuals who know they are in a "high
risk" category will be the least inclined to volunteer if restric-
tions are placed only on those who have tested positively.204
HI. Analysis
A. Proposals to Restrict: Hysteria or Reasoned Responses?
Opponents to proposals to restrict the practices of seroposi-
tive HCWS or to require the patient's informed consent for in-
vasive procedures 0 " argue that the public's fear of AIDS is irra-
198. See infra text accompanying notes 199-204.
199. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
200. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
204. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Eileen Hansen & Tom Steel, The Politics of Hysteria, TEXAs LAW-
YERS 18 (October 28, 1991). "[Einforced disclosure and notification of patients is not
[Vol. 12:665
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tional and uneducated.10 These opponents argue that the
significance the public would attach to the risk would therefore
be disproportionate to the actual risk.207 They feel that, in ad-
dressing the HIV issues in health care, the legislatures and the
CDC have been guided by public hysteria rather than medical
knowledge. 208 They believe the legislatures' various proposals to
restrict practices or require consent have merely been unrealis-
tic, unfounded attempts to satisfy the public's desire to see
something done.209
The medical community has been studying AIDS since the
early 1980's, when the first AIDS cases were identified and the
so-called "hysteria" began. 10 Since that time, many advances
have been made; but we are not yet out of the woods. There are
at least two undisputed things the "experts" do know about HIV
and AIDS: (1) the virus may spread where there is blood to
blood or mucous membrane contact; " ' and (2) there are still
gaps in the scientific community's knowledge of the virus. 2
Given the gaps in understanding, charges that the CDC and
legislative measures are unfounded and unrealistic are, them-
selves, unfounded and unrealistic. In a surgery room or a den-
tist's office, open cuts and spilled blood are commonplace; sharp
instruments such as needles, probes, and scalpels are constantly
in use on or inside the patient. It requires no special knowledge
of science or of AIDS to note these things. The environment is
often quite bloody and, especially in an emergency situation,
quite hectic. Despite the careful precautions many or most of
our hospitals require, gloved hands and masked faces are not al-
necessarily good medicine and, in fact, is generally just the opposite." Id.
206. See id. "[I]n the summer of 1990, science and reason gave way to panic over
reports that a Florida dentist who has since died of AIDS may have infected some of his
patients .... IT]he CDC bowed to public pressure and the tremendous hysteria that has
swept this country in the wake of the Florida case and issued new guidelines." Id.
207. See id. ("Because of the extremely small chance of transmitting the infection,
it must be asked whether physicians and hospitals should unduly alarm their patients
about a procedure that carries no significant life-threatening risk.")
208. See id. One article stated that measures to restrict infected HCWs' practices or
to notify patients of their HCW's seropositivity are examples of laws which "bowl] to
hysteria and [are] shaped by lawyers and insurers concerned primarily with liability." Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
212. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
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ways impervious to slices or pricks by carelessly handled instru-
ments.21 3 The chances of blood to blood contact are actually
quite realistic.2 1
Opponents have also urged the government to back off the
issue, citing the fact that the Acer cases are the only docu-
mented cases of HCW to patient transmission."' The govern-
ment should not be so easily shaken. The low number of docu-
mented cases of this type of transmission, while probative of low
risk, is not dispositive21 6 First, it is notable that there are a
213. See Porter, Management of Patients Treated by Surgeon with HIV Infection,
335 THE LANcET 113 (Jan. 13, 1990). "Potential risk of transmission of blood-borne infec-
tion may be assessed by the risk of glove damage during an operation and the risk of
glove laceration depends on the duration of the operation and on whether the procedure
involves 'mass wound closure'...." Id. See also Sanford F. Kuvin, AIDS Testing: Make
it Mandatory, NEWSDAY, July 19, 1991, (Nassau), at 67. "The measures called for...
wearing of gloves, masks, gowns and protective eyewear, plus improved infection control,
will not guarantee safety in every case. Gloves leak, puncture and rip, and health-care
workers will sometimes make careless mistakes." Id. For an interesting statistical inquiry
into the frequency and various causes of glove tears and injuries caused sharps in the
operating room, see James G. Wright et al., Mechanisms of Glove Tears and Sharp In-
juries Among Surgical Personnel, 266 JAMA 1668 (1991).
214. See, e.g., Frank S. Rhame, The HIV-Infected Surgeon, 264 JAMA 507-508
(July 25, 1990). In his article, which was written before the publication of the Acer cases,
Rhame noted, "No surgeon-to-patient HIV transmission has been reported, but it is an
example of the collective denial that has afflicted past HIV-related deliberations to avoid
vigorous consideration of the issue. Hepatitis B virus transmissions from surgeon to pa-
tient have occurred; it would be unexpected if HIV transmission does not also occur." Id.
at 507 (citations omitted).
While Rhame did not anticipate a large number of exposures, he was quite willing to
admit the potential risk, especially for invasive procedures. He continued, "Presumably,
the exposure rate is strongly influenced by the type of procedure. Ophthalmic surgery
should virtually never produce a surgeon-to-patient blood transfer. In contrast, the hepa-
titis B virus precedent would suggest that vaginal hysterectomy and pelvic surgery are
the most hazardous. These procedures involve blind, ie, not directly visualized, by-feel
manipulation of sharp instruments in patients' body cavities." Id. at 507.
As for appropriate methods of dealing with the HIV infected health care worker,
Rhame referred to the policy of the University of Minnesota Hospital, where he worked.
He explained, "Surgeons are required to determine their HIV status only if they are at
an increased risk of HIV infection. They may undergo testing by whatever means they
desire. If HIV infected, they are required to avoid performing surgery that requires
blind, by-feel manipulation of sharp instruments. We believe that the probability of an
HIV transmission during other types of surgery is so low that no other proscription is
warranted." Id. at 508.
215. See infra note 223.
216. Said one doctor, "[Bergalis] was not the first case of HIV transmission from a
health-care worker to a patient - it was the first documented one - using DNA high-
technology sequencing tests that fingerprinted her blood with the dentist's." Kuvin,
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small percentage of AIDS cases on record with the CDC as hav-
ing unexplained origins. 17 While there is no reason to believe
any or all of these enigmatic cases are attributable to HCW to
patient transmission, it is significant that the medical commu-
nity has not been able to understand or explain every reported
case. Questions remain unanswered. Charges of hysteria and of
unreasoned overreaction are misplaced in a research atmosphere
that continues to be puzzled by its subject. As one article put it:
Public anxiety will not be alleviated by communications from au-
thorities who suggest that the risk is so small that it is the same
as "no" risk or that anyone who is frightened is merely hysterical.
Neither will it be alleviated by messages that try to substitute one
focus for another, e.g., scrutinizing the infection-control practices
of dentists rather than their serological status. These messages
appear to be designed to diminish fear, but they try to do so with-
out acknowledging the validity of the fear. Experts must realize
that health care professionals' and the public's fear of the ac-
quired immunodeficiency syndrome is real, multifaceted, and
quite complex .... Only a dialogue that respects and attempts to
understand the nature of health care professionals' and the pub-
lic's concerns about the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome will
have the possibility of diminishing those concerns. 18
supra note 202.
217. See, e.g., Bayer, supra note 46, at 1768. As of 1986, an estimated 6.6% of the
reported AIDS cases were people whose infection was of unknown origin. Bayer, supra
note 46, at 1768.
218. The excerpt was taken from a reply (written by Barbara Gerbert, Ph.D, et al.)
to a letter written by Frances Taylor, Md, MPH, of San Francisco, California. As evi-
denced by the excerpt, Gerbert and her co-writers were opposed to the way Ms. Taylor
had addressed the issue of "public hysteria," implying that increased infection control
was the simple solution. While the excerpt conveys the weight Gerbert felt should be
accorded to the public's concern about AIDS, Gerbert did not conclude that the public
outcry should be all-controlling. Rather, the reply emphasized that a balance had to be
struck, weighing both the scientific statistics and the public's legitimate concerns. See
Frances Taylor, The Risk of Transmission of HIV From Health Care Professional to
Patient, 266 JAMA 1935-1936 (October 9, 1991) (citations omitted) (quote taken from
comments written by Gerbert in reply to Frances Taylor's letter) [hereinafter, Gerbert
Reply].
This point was further emphasized in a different article by Gerbert. The article was
written in reply to a letter from Larry Gostin, of the American Society of Law and
Medicine, in Boston, Massachusetts. See Larry Gostin, Physicians and the Acquired Im-
munodeficiency Syndrome, 264 JAMA 452-453 (July 25, 1990). In the response, Gerbert
wrote:




Furthermore, the actual significance of the low number of
reported HCW to patient infections is also questionable. The vi-
rus has been known to remain asymptomatic, undetected and, in
some cases, undetectable, for weeks, months, or even years. 19
This dormancy period is vital to the debate, when one considers
that the virus only reared its ugly head about a decade ago. 2
Theoretically, then, instances of HCW to patient transmissions
may have occurred over the past decade which have yet to be
discovered and documented. To make the matter even more in-
teresting, one must consider that if these transmissions did oc-
cur, they might have involved people who have no reason to be-
lieve that they could have been exposed. This would be
especially true of people who had been careful to avoid "high
risk" behaviors221 like unsafe sex, promiscuity, or IV drug use.
Consequently, these unsuspecting people would be unlikely to be
tested for the disease until they had some physical manifesta-
tion, and that could be years.2 2
Finally, although some have hung their hats on the low
number of cases, arguing that the Acer incidents were a freak,223
the potential for infection in the future cannot truly be chal-
lenged. As one article noted, the fact that numerous investiga-
tions have not resulted in large numbers of transmissions is in-
deed encouraging; "[h]owever, similarities between the
epidemiology of hepatitis B virus and HIV imply a theoretical
in our article is a dangerous guide for public policy .... Ongoing scientific evalua-
tion of the hazards posed by HIV-infected health care workers should be the main
basis of policy in this area .... Our purpose in publishing data on the concern
some members of the public have about this issue was to demonstrate to physi-
cians and policymakers that the public's perception of risk may differ from theirs
and to remind them that in formulating policy about HIV-infected health care
workers it is necessary to take into account the views of all stakeholders, including
patients.
Id. at 453.
219. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, Medical Units Lag on AIDS Guidelines, N.Y.
TImEs, August 30, 1991, at Al. According to Dr. M. Roy Schwarz, a vice president of the
American Medical Association, roughly 40 medical groups which gathered in Chicago in
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risk of HIV transmission from infected HCWs to patients.
Transmission of hepatitis B from surgeon to patient has been
reported, and in one study an increased risk of transmission
with high-risk operations was demonstrated. 224
But we need not only look to scientists. Logic, too, tells us
that the risk is real. We know enough about the disease to know
that it passes blood to blood. We know enough about dentists,
hospitals, and surgery to know there is a lot of blood on hand.
We know enough about humans to know that mistakes are
made - barriers are improperly made or placed; needles are
carelessly capped; sharp instruments are clumsily handled; and
infection is unknowingly passed. "[Lay people's] ... conceptual-
ization of risk is much richer than that of experts and reflects
legitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert risk
assessments. '225 As W. Shepherd Smith, Jr., president of Ameri-
cans for a Sound AIDS Policy stated, "[P]eople in the AIDS
community need to understand that a majority of Americans
face their greatest risk of acquiring HIV only through blood
transfusion and in the health-care setting .... The least likely
mode of transmission overall is, in fact, the most likely mode of
transmission for most people. 22
Another objection to restriction proposals or the informed
consent requirement runs as follows: seronegative doctors and
dentists will refrain from treating seropositive patients, because
they will not want to risk losing their livelihoods if they are in-
224. Porter, supra note 213, at 114. Hepatitis B is an inflammation of the liver
which can cause liver cell damage or death. CHARLES B. CLAvMAN, THE AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL ASSOCIATION HOME MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOL. 1, 532-33 (1989). The condition re-
sults from infection by a virus called Hepatitis type B. Id. at 533. The virus' modes of
transmission are through blood, blood products, and sexual activity - "precisely the
same mechanism by which HIV ... is spread." Id. "In a proportion of [type B] cases, the
virus persists for years after the initial infection and may lead to a chronic form of hepa-
titis ... and eventually to liver cirrhosis and/or liver cancer." Id. Hepatitis B is far more
infectious than HIV. Bayer, supra note 46, at 1772. However, a vaccination against viral
hepatitis, type B, is currently available and is recommended to those at high risk of
infection - a group which includes HCWs. Clayman, supra at 534. The Public Health
Service regards hepatitis B as the "paradigm with regard to the transmission of HIV in
the health care setting ... and advises adoption of precautions in all health care settings
where there is possible exposure to blood or body fluids." Gostin, supra note 13, at 38.
225. Gerbert Reply, supra note 218 (citations omitted).
226. Malcolm Gladwell, Senate Vote Ordering AIDS Disclosure a Setback for Ac-




fected by an infected patient.227 Putting aside notions about the
implications of the physicians' vocational oaths and duties' to
treat, the flaw in this suggestion is quite apparent. It can hardly
be suggested that loss of livelihood would serve as a greater de-
terrent than loss of life. As it stands now, many dedicated doc-
tors and dentists are willing to treat seropositive patients de-
spite the risk of eventual infection and consequent loss of life. It
would be strange if these same doctors and dentists would refuse
to treat, based upon the unquestionably less severe risk of loss of
earnings.
A further criticism of legislation and public outcry in this
area comes from gay rights activists, who consider the public's
attitudes and the legislative proposals a step backward in their
fight against discrimination.22" Apparently, they fear the CDC
guidelines, as drafted, will open the door for unchecked discrimi-
nation by hospital and health care administrators against their
employees who test positively or who refuse to be tested.22
Given the high percentage of AIDS victims who are homosexual,
many activists consider discrimination against people with AIDS
227. Elizabeth Rosenthal, Angry Doctors Condemn Plans to Test Them for AIDS,
N.Y. TiuEs, August 20, 1991, at C1.
228. Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 49, at 160. "The disease's early victims were
predominantly gay men, a group collectively defined as deviant by the majority culture.
Information that someone had AIDS necessarily revealed their sexual preferences." Id.
229. See id. Discussing this fear of inequitable treatment of individuals upon disclo-
sure of their seropositivity, one article noted:
The HIV epidemic has made it clear that privacy, like voting, is a right that pre-
serves other rights .... Secrecy and total anonymity are the only sure ways to
protect infected persons against the possibility of state repressive schemes - the
kinds of quarantines and tattoo programs mentioned casually in the popular press.
Secrecy and anonymity are also the only plausible techniques to protect the sick
from private acts of discrimination.
Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 49, at 160.
The same article continued, "The gay community rightly feared that disclosure
would expose them to vicious private retaliatory actions and that the very existence of
such information might facilitate later imposition of quarantines or other restraints."
Edgar & Sandomire, supra note 49, at 165.
(W]e have plunged down a course where access to timely and appropriate
health care will be seriously jeopardized by the potential loss of qualified workers
who are unwilling to disclose their HIV status for fear of being discriminated
against or fired. The shortage of health care workers is much more dangerous to
public health than the remote possibility of HIV transmission by health care
worker to patients.
Hansen & Steel, supra note 205, at 18.
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to be just another means for society to oppress the gay
community.230
In recent years, many people - homosexual and heterosex-
ual - have fought to throw off the prejudice and discrimina-
tion based on sexual preference that is embedded in our cul-
ture.231 There is no place for such discrimination in a society
that strives for equality. And yet, the plight of the homosexual
in America, however shameful, should not cause us to back down
on a point of public health.
There are at least two flaws in allegations that illegal dis-
crimination will result from efforts to implement a mandatory
testing and plan. The first flaw is Constitutional in nature. It is
clear that homosexuals make up a large percentage of HIV posi-
tive people,232 and that as a result, legislative action mandating
periodic HIV testing and requiring the informed consent of pa-
tients would affect more homosexual HCWs than heterosexual
HCWs. The result, or effect, then, may appear to be discrimina-
tory. However, under well established Constitutional jurispru-
dence, a discriminatory effect would not be fatal to the legisla-
tion, because the intent - protecting the public health - is
not invidiously discriminatory.2 s3 If the legislation is grounded
in the legitimate interest of the state in protecting the public
health, a seemingly discriminatory result should not defeat it.234
230. See Edgar and Sandomire, supra note 49, at n.13, where the author drew a
comparison between today's private discrimination against homosexuals and the private
injustices of the notorious McCarthy era: "In the McCarthy era ... the civil liberties
violations did not involve the state locking up putative communists, so much as exposing
them so that private retaliation could do the work." Id.
231. For an interesting discussion of the historical and contemporary oppression of
the homosexual community, see Leonard Orland & Sue L. Wise, The AIDS Epidemic: A
Constitutional Conundrum, 14 HOFsTRA L. Rav. 137 (1986).
232. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
233. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), where the Supreme Court re-
ferred to "the basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed
to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
pose." Id. at 240. The Court continued, "we have not held that a law, neutral on its face
and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one
race than of another." Id. at 242.
234. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 466-71 (1981); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71 (1977) (hold-





A second flaw inherent in arguments citing the discrimina-
tory impact of mandatory testing plans is more practical. The
arguments against mandatory testing plans fail to recognize that
state-mandated testing will actually prove to be less discrimina-
tory in the long run than voluntary testing plans. The concept of
voluntary testing, which the CDC currently endorses - both in
its guidelines of July and in those being drafted at pre-
sent - will prove to be quite ineffective and, in fact, counter-
productive. The probable result of a voluntary scheme will be a
decrease in the number of tests taken and an increase in private
discriminatory employment practices.
First, there will be a decline in the number of tests taken
because HCWs who know they are in "high risk" groups will be
discouraged from testing, to avoid the "knowledge" of seroposi-
tivity and, thus, avoid the obligation to inform. 235 If, on the
other hand, testing is mandatory for all HCWs in certain lines of
work, knowledge of seropositivity cannot be avoided. Second,
the voluntary testing scheme will foster discriminatory employ-
ment practices; for employers who wish to avoid potential civil
liability may conduct "witch hunts" if they suspect that certain
of their employees are in "high risk" groups. In other words,
only those employees whose private lives are known (or, worse
yet, rumored) to put them in "high risk" categories will be pres-
sured by their employers to get tested.2 38 Mandatory testing
rules would eliminate this problem; the testing laws would not
be applied discriminatorily, but would apply to all HCWs in de-
fined lines of work.
Despite the questionable legitimacy of challenges of invidi-
ous discrimination, the cries of the activists have not gone un-
heeded. The fact that the CDC backed down from its July
guidelines and weakened the force of its recommendations for
HIV-infected HCWs 23 7 demonstrates the CDC's attentiveness to
235. Sack, supra note 165, at B6.
236. For instance, refer to the article by Rhame, supra note 214, at 508, wherein the
author referred to the policy at the University of Minnesota Hospital. To conform to the
policy requirement at that facility, surgeons deemed to be in "high risk" categories were
required to undergo testing. Id. Others were not. Id. It is this type of HIV testing pro-
gram that will lead to unfair, unreasoned, and invidious discrimination based on sexual
preference.
237. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
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the objections of interest groups. For instance, one writer
argued:
Bowing to homosexual groups and civil libertarians, the govern-
ment and the public health community have resisted attempts to
institute limited mandatory testing or, where such testing is done,
notify persons who tested positive for the AIDS antibody. Their
concerns seem to have less to do with public health considerations
than with the fears of homosexuals - that their civil liberties
will be violated.
Homosexuals come by their paranoia honestly. Disclosure that a
person has AIDS is still tantamount to evidence of homosexual-
ity. That could have severe repercussions - loss of job, housing
or even custody of a child. Evidence of the AIDS an-
tibody - often a precursor to the disease but not proof of the
disease itself - could result in the cancellation of health insur-
ance. Besides, sexual preference is a private matter. We are talk-
ing about the most personal of acts.. ... Personal privacy is not a
trifling matter. And neither are the concerns of the homosexual
community. But we all have our civil rights. Surely, the foremost
is to life.2
3 8
Perhaps the government and the health care community have
gone too far to pacify the rights activists. The pendulum has
begun to swing, and the rights of the many may now be jeopard-
ized by the rights of the few.
Other opponents of proposals to restrict practices or obtain
consent have suggested that the better solution is to rigorously
educate HCWs about infection barriers and to increase and im-
prove the barriers that are presently in place.239 Thus, the the-
ory runs, with universally applied precautions, direct HCW pa-
tient contact will be extremely limited, and exposure to blood
will be eliminated. 40
Unfortunately, universal safety precautions that, if meticu-
lously enforced would minimize the risk of HIV transmission in
238. Richard Cohen, Routine Tests for AIDS? Yes, THE WASHINGTON POST, March
25, 1987, at A23.
239. See, e.g., Hansen & Steel, supra note 205.
240. See id. "Adherence to universal precautions virtually eliminates what is already
an extremely low risk of transmitting HIV, Hepatitis B, and other blood-borne diseases




the health care setting, are often applied only sporadically." In
some cases, lapses in universal precautions are due to low fund-
ing, improper training, or emergency situations.4 2 In other
cases, the degree of precaution hinges on the individual HCW's
flip-a-coin decision that a patient is "high risk" or on the HCW's
decision regarding his own high risk category.243 Regrettably,
when these HCWs are wrong, they are dead wrong.
The risk of viral transmission from HCW to patient, or vice
versa, in these instances is escalated for two reasons. First, with-
out the recommended barriers, an unsteady hand, an exposed
instrument, or an uncapped needle is much more likely to result
in transmission than when the barriers are in place. Second, this
risk is compounded by the fact that the HCW's carelessness may
be heightened by an irrational confidence based on his own igno-
rant estimation of the patient as being in a "low" or "no risk"
category.
Added to these instances of potential exposure to the virus
are the many unavoidable instances of barrier-free patient con-
tact which are due to emergency circumstances. 24 ' Almost inevi-
tably, even the most conscientious HCW will be faced with a
situation where a patient is in dire need of attention and the
recommended precautionary equipment is unavailable, whether
it be because of the unusual location of the patient or because of
insufficient quantities or sizes of the necessary equipment. 45
Most emergencies - particularly those in which a patient is
losing blood - demand immediate care, care that must proceed
with or without masks, gloves, and other protective equipment.
Again, the risk of exposure to the virus is heightened because
likelihood of blood contact is high and precautions are low.2 46
241. See, e.g., Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, Comments
on Proposed Rule on Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 1-2 (August 14,
1989) (unpublished memorandum).
242. See, e.g., id. at Table 5. Inadequate staffing, lack of equipment, lack of support
from management, and lack of training were among the reasons most often cited as ob-
stacles to use of personal protective equipment while exposed to blood-borne pathogens.
Id.
243. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
244. See Marsha F. Goldsmith, Even 'In Perspective,' HIV Specter Haunts Health
Care Workers Most, 263 JAMA 2413, 2417, 2420 (1990).
245. See generally id. at 2417, 2420.
246. Id. In her article, Marsha Goldsmith talked about the great exposure to blood
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Finally, even in those instances where recommended safety
barriers are perfectly in place, personal equipment is available in
sufficient quantities and sizes, and the procedures are meticu-
lously followed, the risk of transmission is not fully elimi-
nated.247 Albeit minute, the risk of infection in such a clearly
utopian environment still exists and is realized through human
error.24 8 Unfortunately, "[ulniversal precautions do not provide
for universal safety. '2 49 A carelessly handled sharp instrument
could penetrate a barrier and mock the entire precautionary sys-
tem.2 0 The Acer cases, discussed earlier, provide an example of
in emergency rooms. She quoted the director of Johns Hopkins' Emergency Medicine
Residency Program as follows: "'When I talk about exposure, I really mean exposure,' he
said, showing slides to illustrate his point." Id. Goldsmith continued, "In that setting
[emergency rooms], a survey a few years ago of how well universal precautions were fol-
lowed came up woefully short - only 44% of the time for minor interventions and 'an
abysmal' 20% for major interventions." See id. (citing Gabor D. Kelen, M.D., et al.,
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in Emergency Department Patients, Epide-
miology Clinical Presentation, and Risk to Health Care Workers: The Johns Hopkins
Experience, 262 JAMA 516-22 (1989)). Notably, a follow-up study was conducted some
time later, and compliance levels had improved considerably. Goldsmith, supra note 244,
at 2417.
Emergency room physicians cited various reasons for non-compliance. "Some said
there wasn't enough time for them to don the many recommended articles of protective
clothing, and others said it was just too cumbersome and interfered with their skill, or
was uncomfortable." Id.
247. See, e.g., Gerbert Reply, supra note 218, at 1935.
248. Id.
249. Kuvin, supra note 213, at 67.
250. Gerbert Reply, supra note 218, at 1935. Referring to the call for increased at-
tention to infection barriers, one article recognized that, with the publication of the Acer
cases, "the risk of transmission in a health care setting has been demonstrated to be real,
rather than merely the product of fear and hysteria on the part of the public and some
health care workers... ." Id. The article continued,
We applaud concern about infection control .... [H]owever, implementation of
universal precautions is neither "simple" nor "clear-cut." We have been monitor-
ing dentists' use of infection control since the middle 1980s. It has improved con-
siderably over the years but will never be universal or foolproof. Even the best
infection control protocols cannot prevent accidents. Scientists, practitioners, and
the public must be helped to understand that there will always be "some" risk of
HIV transmission in dental offices. Calling it "very low" does not extinguish fears.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See also Goldsmith, supra note 244, at 2413. This article pointed out that "[e]ven in
the extremely infection control-conscious environment of [San Francisco General Hospi-
tal], about half the needles discarded in special safety containers are found to be re-
capped - and a survey in The Johns Hopkins Emergency Department, among others,
showed that half of all HIV-associated needle sticks involve recapped needles." Id.




Objectors to mandatory testing schemes have also argued
that, due to the time lapses that may (and often do) occur be-
tween infection with HIV and manifestation of HIV antibodies,
HCWs who have been infected may slip by undetected2 5 Theo-
retically, these infected HCWs would pose a greater risk, be-
cause they would be operating under a false sense of security,
confident that they are seronegative.5
The answer to this criticism, however, is not to forego the
whole testing scheme. Rather, the answer is to set up a regular,
periodic testing system, whereby HCWs are tested at intervals.
Although the latency period will inevitably allow some infected
HCWs to remain undetected by the first HIV tests, seropositiv-
ity will eventually be discovered by subsequent testing. In any
case, performing the tests and making as many people as possi-
ble aware of their HIV status is preferable to foregoing
mandatory testing because a few may go undetected for a time.
This "all or none" approach is unwarranted.
As for concerns of increased hazards to patients caused by
an infected HCW's false sense of security, this is where the use-
fulness of universal precautions and infection barriers is most
apparent. HIV is not the only communicable disease against
which universal infection barriers are designed to protect.254 A
negative showing on an HIV test - especially for an HCW who
is aware of his or her "high risk" status - cannot be construed
as license to disregard all requisite infection barriers. A
mandatory HIV testing scheme and a system of infection barri-
ers should be implemented in tandem to minimize the risks.
suggested that while the best response to the possibility of HIV infection remains pri-
mary prevention, it is not fool-proof. Gerberding stated, "I think some people still be-
lieve that we can reduce risks effectively by practicing good infection control across the
board. Unfortunately, this is probably not going to be the case entirely." Id.
251. See supra notes 6, 70-84 and accompanying text.
252. See Kantrowitz, supra note 61, at 53-54.
253. Id.
254. For instance, universal precautions are also necessary to prevent Hepatitis B
transmission. See CDC, Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus, Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive
Procedures, 266 JAMA 771, 774 (1991).
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B. The Acer Cases and Informed Consent
Unfortunately for science, there was no "instant replay"
video in the Acer cases. The play-by-play, showing just how Dr.
Acer's strain of HIV infected his patients, will never be seen.
Did transmission occur through a prick of a needle? a slice of an
instrument through a glove? a contaminated, improperly cleaned
instrument? a misapplied infection barrier? a properly applied,
but ineffective infection barrier? Science will never know.
Unfortunately for a few of his patients, the transmis-
sion - whatever its vehicle - was deadly. In the final analy-
sis, it hardly matters to Kimberly Bergalis and the others if the
virus entered through a glove, a drill, or a needle. Their dentist
knew he had AIDS. They were unaware of his condition. Months
later, though, Dr. Acer's illness was a secret no longer. His ill-
ness was their own.
The patients who were infected by Dr. Acer probably visited
his office with the same low-level anxiety that many people feel
on their way to the dentist's chair. They worry about drills and
probes. They worry about cavities and fillings. They worry about
bleeding gums and open nerves. These are the risks and discom-
forts they probably anticipated. By coming to the office and
opening wide their mouths, though, these patients accepted
these risks. The patients did not, however, accept the
risk - albeit minute - that, in addition to the temporary
pain and numbness, they would be exposed to HIV. That risk
was not accepted, nor was it even contemplated, because it was
not disclosed.
Until science develops a vaccination or cure, infection with
HIV most likely will eventually be lethal.2 55 The grave conse-
quence of infection - regardless of the low likelihood of its oc-
currence - must surely play a part in the patient's right to be
informed of the risk.2 6
The question of the patient's right to know and the physi-
cian's duty to disclose brings us back to the doctrine of informed
consent.257 At least in those jurisdictions that hold physicians to
a lay standard of care, disclosure of a risk is required where that
255. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 140-57 and accompanying text.




risk is "material. ' 258 As discussed earlier, "materiality" has been
found where the risk is such that a "reasonable" physician
knows (or should know) that his "reasonable" patient would at-
tach some significance to the risk in making his intelligent deci-
sion to undergo or forego treatment.25
A glance at opinion polls 260 will confirm what most people
already know: AIDS is not a matter which the American pub-
lic - which is essentially the pool of "reasonable" pa-
tients - treats lightly.261 It is certainly a matter to which most
patients would attach at least some significance. This is not sur-
prising, of course, because AIDS is not a trifling matter; it is
deadly. At least in those jurisdictions that have embraced the
newer view, the lay standard,6 2 disclosure of the material risk of
HIV infection should be mandated.
In those jurisdictions that adhere to the older view, the pro-
fessional standard of care, 6 3 the doctrine would not require dis-
closure unless disclosure was customary in the medical commu-
nity.24 Given that AIDS is a relatively new disease and that the
percentage of seropositive physicians is relatively low (when
compared to the number of healthy, seronegative physicians),
the community really has not had to establish a standard of dis-
closure in this area. Unlike many other risks which are inherent
in a specific procedure, this particular risk is inherent in a spe-
cific health care worker. Thus, in jurisdictions following the pro-
fessional standard of care model, disclosure may not be the cus-
tom because the risk will not be universally encountered and
considered by all physicians in the community.
As a result, the unfortunate potential for a "conspiracy of
silence," 265 suggested by courts who have rejected the older view,
is compounded by the fact that a standard may not exist at all.
Along the lines of the conspiracy of silence objection, there is
258. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 93.
261. See, e.g., Breo, supra note 5. "[D]ealing as it does with stigmatization, taboo
behaviors, and certain death, AIDS clearly is perceived by the public as a different dis-
ease, requiring special precautions." Id. at 1464 (emphasis omitted).
262. See supra notes 124-44 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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also the reality that many doctors and dentists would probably
not be inclined to testify to a risk of transmission or a standard
of disclosure, even if it did exist. To do so could only work to
limit the rights and flexibility of the health care community, and
it would invite legislative and judicial intervention. However
cynical it may seem, the legislature might be better served by
looking beyond the heated objections and denials of risk pro-
pounded by the medical community, to see just how much the
medical community has at stake.
"[We] must be concerned that the medical center decision-
makers, while no doubt acting in good faith in the decision mak-
ing process, are acting with the knowledge that their decisions
may well affect their ultimate ability to practice their chosen
profession. '266 Perhaps the medical community's efforts to pac-
ify the "hysterical" public should be taken with a grain of salt.
The recent federal proposal on this issue, H.R. 2788,27 is,
perhaps, a subtle indication of legislative mistrust of the medical
community's denial of risk. If adopted, the new law will hinge
certain federal monies upon state compliance with federally im-
posed guidelines.6 8 The proposed law would require the CDC to
go further than it has and insist on mandatory periodic testing,
rather than leaving it up to the discretion of the individual
HCW.26 9 Those HCWs whose practice puts them in regular and
inevitable contact with their patients' body cavities, blood, or
mucous membranes would be tested periodically for exposure to
the HIV virus.70 Upon a positive test result, these HCWs would
be required to refrain from practice or to obtain their patients'
informed consent before continuing to perform invasive
procedures. -
The states have the prerogative to enforce the mandatory
testing scheme and to require informed consent for invasive pro-
266. Estate of Behringer v. The Medical Center at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1278
(N.J. 1991).
267. H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See supra note 183 and accompanying
text.







cedures, through the exercise of their police power.27 2 The public
health has long been held to be within the realm and control of
the police powers.2 73 And the proposals to require testing and to
illicit informed consent are reasonably tailored to meet the legit-
imate state interest in preserving the public health.
What is needed is a systematic schedule of HIV testing,
mandated by the individual states and encouraged by the fed-
eral government through health care funding, for those HCWs
who perform invasive procedures. These procedures should be
uniformly defined and compiled in a list to ensure uniformity
and to reduce the need for individual discretion. Where sero-
positivity is detected in an individual HCW, he should be re-
quired to report his seropositivity to those patients on whom he
is to perform invasive procedures and to illicit their consent to
further invasive treatment. Where seropositivity is not indicated
by the tests, all HCWs should continue to implement the univer-
sal precautions currently in place, ever mindful of the potential
for transmission of other communicable disease, of the possibil-
ity of a false negative test result, and of their own need for pro-
tection from any diseases the patient might transmit.
IV. Conclusion
HIV poses a unique dilemma in the health care setting, be-
cause it requires a balancing of delicate interests. However, the
state and individual interests in preserving health cannot be
subordinate to the individual HCW's interests in maintaining
privacy and preserving livelihood. Said W. Shepherd Smith,
president of Americans for a Sound AIDSIHIV Policy, a Wash-
272. The states' rights and duties with respect to the medical profession are clearly
supported in American jurisprudence under the general rubric of state sovereignty, state
"police power" and the public interest. See, e.g., Pierce v. New Hampshire, 46 U.S. 504,
525 (1847) (referring to powers reserved to the states); see also Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v.
Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 351 N.W.2d 701 (1984) (for proposition that police
power is an attribute of state sovereignty).
273. Barsky v. Board of Regents of N.Y., 347 U.S. 442 (1954). In Barsky, the Su-
preme Court noted,
It is elemental that a state has broad power to establish and enforce standards of
conduct within its borders relative to the health of everyone there. It is a vital
part of a state's police power. The state's discretion in that field extends naturally
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ington based group, "This does not seem sufficient to give the
public what it is asking for, which is just more knowledge to
base decisions on . . .. The public feels individuals have the
right to know whether they will be exposed to a potentially fatal
disease, regardless of the degree of risk."2 4
If the risk of transmission from HCW to patient is very low,
then the public should be educated about the probabilities and
about the medical community's diligent efforts to maintain uni-
versal infection control. This does not, however, mean that the
existence of the risk should be denied, nor that an individual's
decision whether to accept that risk should be made by a third
party. The risk, however small, is certainly not insignificant; its
realization could mean death. Denial and non-disclosure cannot
be the way to enlightenment regarding this enigmatic virus.
As one court noted in embracing a broad scope of disclosure
for informed consent, "Anglo-American law starts with the pre-
mise of thoroughgoing self-determination, each man considered
to be his own master. This law does not permit a physician to
substitute his judgment for that of the patient by any form of
artifice. 2 75 We must be ever-mindful of the value of individual
physical self-determination when considering the very sensitive
issues surrounding HIV-infected HCWs. In the final analysis, in
order to better deal with the problem, we must be open about it.
Anything less than openness is to return to medieval notions of
paternalism or to more recent notions that there is a class of
citizens who are somehow above the law and who know what is
best for the "common man." Do we dare now, for the sake of
political expediency or the desire not to imperil individual eco-
nomic opportunities, abandon a precious principle of a demo-
cratic society - namely informed consent?
Susan E. Brownt
274. Sack, supra note 165, at B6.
275. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d at 556 (Okla. 1979).
t To my father, Kenneth J. Brown, Jr., who has always been a steady source of
inspiration and encouragement, and for whom I have immeasurable respect and
affection.
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